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THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S RESPONSE TO
HOMELESSNESS: DEPENDING ON THE KINDNESS
OF STRANGERS
Lois G. Williams, Shelley R. Jackson, Frank R. Trinity,
and Susan Schorr*
L

INTRODUCTION

The picture is familiar: a man with forlorn expression, tattered clothes, and
bulging sacks sits on a bench, the Washington Monument towering behind him.
Apart from the Monument, the scene is not peculiar to the nation's capital. And
whatever the root causes of homelessness," and however responsibility is
apportioned between local and federal governments, people" sleeping in the public
places of the District of Columbia are the District government's immediate
problem.
In this article, we explore the response of the District of Columbia during the
1980s, when, like most urban centers, it was confronted with a suddenly
burgeoning problem of homelessness. We trace the District's response to that
crisis, from the initial positive attitudes expressed by the elected leaders and the
* Ms. Williams and Ms. Schorr are attorneys at the Washington law firm of Howrey & Simon; Mr.
Trinity is a staff attorney for the Washington Legal Clinic forthe Homeless; Ms. Jackson is a staff attorney at
the Mental Health Law Project. All have actively represented the homeless in actions to enforce their rights to
shelter or have engaged in other advocacy for the rights of homeless people to housing and appropriate
services.
Ms. Williams acknowledges the assistance of Van C. Ernest and Lisalyn Jacobs, attorneys at Howrey &
Simon, in the preparation of this article.
Ms. Jackson acknowledges the assistance of Claudia Schlosberg, Esq., and law clerk Martha Pollack in
providing information used in this article. Mr. Trinity thanks Steve Harburg, John BeIsner Tom Karr. Nancy
McFadden and Ian Hinds of the law firm of O'Melvcny and Meyers for their contributions in the Fountain
case, and Drew Fossum and Tim Durst of the law firm of Baker and Botts, and Ken Zimmerman. former staff
attorney at the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, for their work in Johnson v.Dixon.
1. We leave the analysis of causes to others, who have pointed to such causal factors as generally
unfavorable economic conditions, widespread demolition of low-rent housing, defunding of federal housing and
income-subsidy programs, deinstitutionalization of the mentally ill, and deindustrialization of the economy.
See Wes Daniels, Symposium on Law and the Homeless: An Introduction,45 U. MitI L Rmv 261 (No-.Jan. 1990-1991); Lucie White, Representing 'The Real Deal," 45 U Mm.si L REV 271, 280-281 nn. 25-31.
2. Estimates of the number of homeless people in the District vary. The US. Census Bureau reported in
April 1991 that there were 4,813 homeless people in the District. Hall, Homeless Count FurorMounts, USA
Today, April 15, 1991. The Community Partnership for the Prevention of Homelessness cites estimates
ranging from 3,500 to 7,000. HOMELESS FAMIuES INmATiVE IN THE DISmcR OF COLUMBIA PROPOSAL 20,
(Jan. 19, 1990). DC-HOME, a privately-funded strategic planning project, issued a report on April 29. 1991,
estimating that there are 10,000 homeless people in the District. DC-HOME REPORT 1, (Apr. 29, 1991).
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body politic, and resulting gains for the homeless population, through the backlash
of negative response that took away many of the gains. We illustrate this history
with discussion of Atchison v. Barry,3 Fountain v. Barry,4 and Johnson v. Dixon,0
three class actions brought by homeless people. We examine the District of
Columbia Council's 1990 vote to eliminate the right to shelter and critique the
statute passed that year and touted as a more "compassionate" approach to the
problems of homeless citizens. Finally, we attempt an assessment of the use of
litigation and legislative advocacy to enforce these rights.

U.
A.

THE CREATION OF A RIGHT TO SHELTER IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Origins

Despite the maxim that food and shelter are the most basic necessities of human
life, the government has no obligation to provide them. Although it is
unquestionably a function of government "to provide for the general welfare," that
broad truism has not traditionally been construed to require the government to
shelter the needy at public expense."
Judicial recognition that state law could provide homeless individuals and
families a right to basic necessities such as food, shelter, and bathing facilities
began in the late 1970s, with the New York case of Callahan v. Carey.7 The
Callahan plaintiffs sought a temporary injunction requiring the state and city
officials to provide meals and shelter to the homeless men of New York City's
Bowery district.' The court granted the injunction and held that the Bowery's
homeless men were entitled to board and shelter under the state constitution and
the laws of the city and state.9 It charged the "public officials responsible for

3. No. 88-CAI1976 (D.C. Super. Ct. vacated June 25, 1991).
4. No. 90-CA1503 (D.C. Super. Ct. vacated Nov. 15, 1991), aff'd sub noma.
Fountain v. Kelly, No. 91CV1462 (D.C. Aug. 23, 1993).
5. No. 91-1979 (D.D.C. voluntarily dismissed Dec. 4, 1991).
6. See Lindsay v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (rejecting the right to housing as fundamental under
the U.S. Constitution and finding that "[a]bsent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing,.
[is a] legislative, not judicial function.").
7. No. 42582/79 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1979); See also N.Y.L.J., Dec. II, 1979, at 10, col. 4.
8. The Callahan consent decree required the provision of "food, beds, mattresses, sheets, pillowcases,
pillows, blankets, towels, soap, toilet paper and laundry service." Thrower v. Perales, 523 N.Y.S.2d 933, 936
n. 3 (1987).
9. The court based its holding on Article XviI, § 1 of the New York State Constitution; §§ 62 (I) and
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caring for the needy to find such lodgings." 101 Ultimately, the city entered into a
consent decree establishing standards for adequate sleeping, recreation, and toilet
facilities for "members of the homeless male population of the City of New
York."'"
Officials of the District of Columbia recognized the legitimacy of a claim of
right to shelter in February 1979, when then-Mayor Marion Barry announced his
policy on homelessness. In press and policy statements, the Mayor asserted that
"'shelter is a basic human right" and that "anyone who requests or is in apparent
need of shelter is entitled to it." 12 The Mayor established a Commission on
Homelessness to implement his policy. A formal agreement between the Mayor
and his Commission in March 1979 charged the Department of Human Resources
with managing some of the city's existing homeless shelters. 3
Barely a year later, the Mayor initiated plans to close some of the city's shelters.
When a class of homeless men sought to stop the city, the district court held that
the government must observe minimal due process requirements before cutting off
funds. Because the plaintiffs "possessed a property interest in continued occupancy
and use of their shelter" that rose to the level of an entitlement," the District was
required to give notice of its plans to close the shelters and an opportunity for
plaintiffs to present written comments."' This was the first judicial recognition
that, once sheltered by the District, a homeless person had a right to minimal due
process before being deprived of shelter."' Although plaintiffs sought greater
procedural protections, the Court of Appeals indicated that if a constitutionally
protected property interest in the shelters existed at all, it was adequately

131 (1) and (3) of the Social Services Law; § 604.1.0 (b) of the New York City Administrative Codk In Re
Jones v. Berman, 37 N.Y.2d. 42, 332 N.E.2d. 303, 371 N.Y.S.2d. 422 (1975).
10. N.Y.L.J., Dec. 11, 1979, at 10, col. 5.
11. Id. Citing equal protection considerations, the court subsequently held that women were entitled to
facilities that met the same standards enunciated in the Callahan consent decree. Eldredge v. Kcch, 118
Misc.2d. 163, 459 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983).
12. Williams v. Barry, 490 F. Supp. 941, 942-43 (D.D.C. 1980). affd in part and vacated In part, 703
F.2d 789 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
13. See id.
14. Id. at 946. The court found a basis for this entitlement in Mayor Barry's public statements, his
establishment of a Commission on Homelessness, formal agreements between the Mayor and the Commission,
and public notification of shelter openings. Id. at 946-47.
15. Williams v. Barry, 708 F.2d. at 789.
16. Williams, 490 F. Supp. at 947. Later that year, the court held that the entitlement to shelter, which
could not be abolished without appropriate due process protections, extended to residents of family shelters.
Caton v. Barry, 500 F. Supp. 45, 48 (D.D.C. 1980).
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17
protected by the process required by the lower court.

B.

Initiative 17

Although procedural due process rights might aid in protecting what the
homeless already had, they were of no assistance in establishing a right to shelter.
Accordingly, homeless advocates took legislative action. Led by Mitch Snyder and
the Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV), they undertook a campaign
for a voters' initiative that would guarantee the District's homeless "safe, sanitary,
8
and accessible shelter space, offered in an atmosphere of reasonable dignity."'
The advocates gathered signatures from registered District voters to place the
measure on the ballot for the November 1984 election, as Initiative 17 (the
Overnight Shelter Act).19
Both the Mayor and the Council campaigned to prevent a vote on Initiative 17.
The government sought a preliminary injunction to prevent the District of
Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics (Board of Elections) from placing the
initiative on the ballot, and a declaratory judgment that it was not proper for the
initiative process.20 The court denied the request for preliminary injunction, ruling
that the District had failed to make an adequate showing of irreparable harm. 21
The vote on the initiative went forward.
Having lost its battle to prevent voters from considering the initiative, the
17. Williams, 708 F.2d at 790.
18. See Affidavit of Susanne Sinclair-Smith, attached to Plaintiffs' Motion for Further Relief (Dccl. J.)
(July 6, 1990), Atchison v. Barry, No. 88-CA11976 (D.C. Super. Ct. July 5, 1990) [hereinafter SinclairSmith Affidavit] ; see also WASHINGTON POsT, Aug. 2, 1984, at C3; Oct. 30, 1984, at BI; Nov. 4, 1984, at
B3.
19. WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 2, 1984, at C3; Oct. 30, 1984, at BI; Nov. 4, 1984, at B3; see also D.C.
CODE ANN. § 1-1320 (1981); D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 3, §§ 1002.5, 1004-1005, 1012.1 (1984).
20. The District alleged that Initiative 17 was a law "appropriating funds" and was therefore not the
proper subject for direct voter legislation under the Home Rule Act. That Act, as amended, recognizes D.C.
voters' right to draft and enact legislation through the initiative process. See District of Columbia SelfGovernment and Governmental Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-198, 87 Stat. 774 (1973), as amended by
Initiative, Referendum and Recall Charter Amendments Act of 1977, D.C. Law 2-46, 24 D.C. Reg. 199, as
amended, Pub. L. No. 95-526, 92 Stat. 2023 (Oct. 27, 1978); D.C. CODE. ANN. § 1-281 ct seq. (1981). This
right is subject to several exceptions including one that prohibits voters from enacting "laws appropriating
funds." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281(a) (1981). As construed in Convention Center Referendum Committee v.
District of Columbia Board of Elections and Ethics, 441 A.2d 889, 913-14 (D.C. 1981), that exception
prevents the electorate from using the initiative to adopt a budget request act or make some other affirmative
effort to appropriate funds.
21. D.C. Board of Elections & Ethics v. District of Columbia, 520 A.2d 671 (D.C. 1986); see also
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 30, 1984, at BI; Nov. 4, 1984, at B3.
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government then campaigned to defeat Initiative 17 at the polls. It spent nearly
$7,000 to have opposition pamphlets, flyers, and posters printed.' These materials
were distributed on election day by on-duty District employees .2
In the public debate over Initiative 17, supporters characterized the measure as
"the just and necessary thing to do," because District citizens were suffering and
dying on the streets. Until better, long-term solutions could be found, shelter was a
first priority.24 Supporters also argued that the initiative could help determine the
needs of the District's homeless population.2 5 Opponents, including some church
groups, shelter providers, and private community organizations, asserted that
passage of Initiative 17 would result in "warehousing" homeless people without
providing other needed services, allow the city to avoid implementing a more
comprehensive approach to homelessness, 2' and make the District a "magnet" for
homeless people who would come from other areas to take advantage of
27
guaranteed shelter.
Nevertheless, when election day finally came, Initiative 17 passed with seventytwo percent of the vote.2 8 The District of Columbia became the first jurisdiction in
the United States to legislate the right to shelter. 0
Still the District government pursued its declaratory judgment action in an
effort to prevent Initiative 17 from becoming law. This effort failed; the Court of
Appeals later held that the right to shelter was a proper subject for voter-initiated
legislation.3 0 The court found no legislative intent to exclude measures from the
initiative process simply because they have fiscal implications. The appellate court
held that neither the provision for judicial review nor the fact that the initiative
was in some ways analogous to an entitlement program made Initiative 17 an
22. District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d I. 2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
23. WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 1984, at B3. As a result of the District's actions, Common Cause and
several taxpayers successfully brought suit to prevent the District from expending public funds to oppose
citizens' initiatives. See District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia, 858 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1988).
24. Snyder, Should We "'Require" Shelter for the Homeless?: Yes, \VASINTrO. POsT. Oct. 14. 1984,
at D8, col. 1.
25. Id.
26. Nahikian, Should We "Require" Shelter for the Homeless?: No, VAsHIINoTON PosT, Oct. 14,
1984, at D8, col. 1.
27. Barker, Battle on Homelessness: Districtto Vote on GuaranteedShelter, WASHINGTo POST, NO.
4, 1984, at B3, col. 1.
28. See WASHINGTON PosT, Nov. 7, 1984, at A41; see also Sinclair-Smith Affidavit, supra note 18.
29. WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7, 1984, at A41.
30. See Convention Center Referendum Committee v. D.C. Board of Elections and Ethis, 520 A.2d.
671, 672 (D.C. 1986).
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"appropriations" measure."
On March 14, 1985, Initiative 17 became D.C. Law 5-146, the D.C. Right to
Overnight Shelter Act. 32 It offered a simple guarantee: "All persons in the District
of Columbia shall have the right to adequate overnight shelter. ' 33 Adequate
shelter is that which "to a reasonable degree maintains, protects, and supports
human health, is accessible, safe, and sanitary, and has an atmosphere of
34
reasonable dignity.
C. The Family Shelter Act
During the early and mid-1980s, more and more families became homeless in
the nation's capital. Although protected by Initiative 17, homeless families with
children were viewed as needing special protection.
Several hundred families were confined to cramped, rodent-infested hotel rooms.
For meals, they had to go to a central facility three times a day. One owner put
out the fifty families at his hotel from 7 a.m. until 7 p.m. each day. In some

shelters, residents taking showers or dressing for bed were humiliated by
unannounced "room checks" by hotel shelter staff. The stress of this transient
lifestyle and prison mentality manifested itself in numerous health problems and
increasing absences of the children from school.
The District of Columbia Council held a series of public roundtables and
hearings on the spending of exorbitant sums on facilities that threatened the wellbeing of children. 35 District spending on hotel shelters increased from $2 million in
1986 to almost $6 million in 1987.36 Individual hotel owners received as much as

31. Id. at 675.
32. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 3-601 et seq. (1981). All District of Columbia legislation, whether passed
by the Council of the District of Columbia (with the exception of legislation that should take effect
immediately because of emergency circumstances) or the voter initiative process, is subject to review by the
United States Congress. If the Congress does not by joint resolution disapprove the legislation within 30 days,
excluding weekends, holidays, and any day on which neither House is in session, such legislation automatically
becomes District of Columbia law. This review period is known as the Congressional layover period. Id. § I233(c)(1).
33. Id. § 3-601.
34. Id.
35. H.R. Crawford, then-Chair of the Human Services Committee, commented that in using hotel
shelters the District paid "outrageous fees" to "profiteers whose only motive was to get what they could from
the government." Council of the District of Columbia, 7th Period, 1st Sess., 20th Legislative Meeting, at 19
(Nov. 10, 1987). Crawford also lamented the "adverse impact which those long stays ... in one-room hotels
and motels are having on our children." Id.
36.

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN SERVICES. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. REPORT. ATTACHMENT
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$65 per night for each room, exclusive of food and other services. 37
Against this backdrop, the Council enacted the Emergency Shelter Services for
Families Reform Amendment Act of 1987 (Family Shelter Act). aa This law, which
took effect on March 11, 1988, gave the Mayor one year to eliminate the District's
reliance on hotel shelters. Under the Act, families could be placed in hotel shelters
only when unforeseen circumstances allowed no acceptable alternative and only
for a maximum period of fifteen days.39 The Council mandated that families be
placed in "supervised apartment-style housing" with (1) separate cooking
facilities; (2) private bathroom facilities; (3) separate sleeping facilities for adults
and minor children; and (4) immediate access to recreational facilities. 40 The Act
also mandated the creation of four regional resource centers to provide social
services 4" and required that the District "exhaust all efforts to obtain permanent
42
housing" for homeless families.
Presumably, in enacting Initiative 17 and the Family Shelter Act, the voters and
the Council intended that homeless persons would be adequately sheltered, at
public expense if necessary. For years, however, the existence of these laws made
little difference to homeless people.
Ell.

A.

ENFORCEMENT OF THE RIGHT

To

SHELTER

Single Persons: Atchison v. Barry

1. Proving the Violation
By the fall of 1988, the city shelters for men and women were dramatically
inadequate, both in number and in quality of life. They were consistently
overcrowded, unhealthy, and unsafe. Even when beds were available, many
homeless people were afraid to go into city shelters. Mitch Snyder appealed for
help at a Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless training seminar on homeless
persons' legal rights. He secured the assistance of a law firm to investigate

M (May
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

3, 1990).
Fountain v. Barry, No. 90-CA1503, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 68 (Oct. 12, 1990).
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 3-206.3, -206.6 to -206.8 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
Id. § 3-206.3(g)(1)-(2).
Id. § 3-206.3(b)(1).
Id. § 3-206.3(i).

42. Id. § 3-206.3(0(1).
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conditions in city shelters and bring suit to enforce the requirements of Initiative
17. The class action that resulted was Atchison v. Barry.4"

The attorneys and volunteers interviewed shelter providers and secured
affidavits-even from providers who relied on city funding-confirming that the
shelters indeed were overcrowded and turning away homeless people. Affidavits
were also obtained from professionals who routinely visited the shelters, such as
nurses with Health Care for the Homeless, attesting to the overcrowded,
unhealthy, and unsafe conditions at the District's shelters." In the lawsuit that
resulted, homeless witnesses spoke of being beaten and robbed in city shelters; of
being abused by security guards; of sleeping on tables, chairs, or the floor; of
clogged and overflowing toilets, even where they slept; and of rats, lice, and
45
scabies.
On December 20, 1988, attorneys filed a complaint in the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia on behalf of a group of homeless men and women and
CCNV, challenging the District's failure to comply with Initiative 17.40 The
plaintiffs sought both a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary
injunction requiring the District to provide "adequate shelter in the manner
required by law, for all homeless people in the District of Columbia in need of
such shelter. ' 47 The affidavits of numerous homeless people, shelter providers, and
other professionals were submitted in support of emergency relief. 48
43. No. 88-CA11976 (D.C. Super. Ct. vacated June 25, 1991)[hereinafter Atchison]; See Atchison,
Complaint (filed Dec. 20, 1988).
44. See Atchison, Affidavits in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dec. 20, 1988).
45. See Atchison, Supplemental and Expanded Findings of Fact at 2, 5 (Jan. 12, 1989).
46. Atchison, Plaintiffs' Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages (Dec. 20, 1988).
47. Atchison, Plaintiffs' Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and for Preliminary Injunction (Dec.
20, 1988).
48. See Atchison, Affidavits in Support of Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support
of Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (Dec. 20, 1988). It was necessary to find and produce such
witnesses to prove violations of the law. Because the most logical place and time to talk to homeless witnesses
was on the District streets after the shelters were closed to new arrivals, teams of attorneys, notaries public,
and members of CCNV roamed city streets late at night interviewing homeless people. If the interviewee
agreed to execute an affidavit documenting his or her experience, the attorneys helped the individual prepare
the affidavit and a notary public notarized it on the spot. Many of these affidavits became part of the record.
When the District noticed the depositions of many of the TRO affiants the day after the TRO hearing,
the plaintiffs faced the challenge of locating the affiants to produce them for their scheduled depositions. They
did not live in shelters and, by definition, had no building address. In fact, one affiant poignantly listed his
address as the grate at 18th and D Streets. As a result, several of the affiants were produced out-of-turn as
they were located. Plaintiffs also produced additional homeless people willing to testify when the original
affiants could not be located. Notwithstanding the logistical difficulties, the District did depose a great many of
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On December 22, 1988, Judge Michael F. Rankin conducted a TRO hearing.
The court denied plaintiffs' TRO request based on the District's assertion that it
planned to open additional facilities to house the homeless that evening.4 °
A four-day evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Harriett Taylor in the
first week of January 1989. It focused on (1) whether the existing shelter beds
were sufficient to serve the numbers of homeless persons seeking shelter in the
District; (2) the accessibility of those shelter beds; and (3) the safety and sanitary
conditions in city shelters.
On January 7, 1989, the court granted a preliminary injunction. Convening a
special Saturday session to deliver her ruling, Judge Taylor held that (1) the

plaintiffs were likely to suffer "immediate and irreparable injury or loss to their
health and lives" without emergency relief; (2) the plaintiffs were likely to succeed
on their claims that the shelters were consistently full or over capacity; and (3)
that the city had failed to take "reasonable steps to provide health-maintaining
and accessible overnight shelter" in an atmosphere of "reasonable dignity," as
required by the statute.5 0
The court's order required the District to "take reasonable steps to provide
overnight shelter ... for all homeless single men and women in the District who
desire it; ... to keep the ...[enumerated] shelters open until further order of the

Court;"'" to make 50 additional beds available for single women; to open

these people, all within about two weeks' time.
49. The court also set a preliminary injunction hearing for early January. Atchison. Order (De. 22,
1988). The matter was soon thereafter assigned to Judge Harriett R Taylor.
50. Atchison, Preliminary Injunction Order (Jan. 6. 1989)(Taylor, J.). The problem of safety was
especially acute in the case of homeless women, who frequently hide themselves because of their vulnerabIity
to attack. The plaintiffs had obtained affidavits from one homeless woman before filing suit and from another
during the course of the preliminary injunction hearing. The District successfully moved to dismiss both as
party plaintiffs, on the ground that neither was actually seeking shelter from the city. Atchison, Order (Jan. 7,
1989). The District then moved to deny relief to any female homeless person for lack of standing. Atchison,
Transcript, Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 29-32 (Jan. 6, 1989). Plaintiffs argued that the relief needed
for women was the same as for men, and that therefore a man could be an adequate class representative. The
court agreed, and denied the District's motion. Two months later, the court reinstated one woman as a party
plaintiff, based on her sworn testimony at deposition that she was indeed homeless and seeking shelter from
the District. Atchison, Order (Jan. 7, 1989); Atchison, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 3,6 (Mar. 16,
1989). Judge Taylor subsequently certified the class as "all single or unattached homeless people in the
District of Columbia." Atchison, Order (Feb. 21, 1989).
51. Atchison, Preliminary Injunction Order (Jan. 6, 1989). In the time between the denial of the TRO
and the preliminary injunction hearing, the District had opened a series of temporary shelters in abandoned
schools and other vacant properties throughout the city. The District attempted to duplicate its inning
strategy before Judge Rankin. Its plan was to thwart plaintiffs' claim of injury-by showing that it had
provided adequate shelter-and thereby avoid a court order obligating it to keep such shelters open. Hovever,
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additional shelters when necessary and to publish the location of these shelters; to
submit a plan for bringing existing shelters "up to minimum standards of
sanitation, safety and decency within a reasonable time;" and to keep the shelters
open between the hours of 7 p.m. and 7 a.m.52 The order also allowed plaintiffs'
representatives to inspect the shelters twice a week.5 3 Finally, the order set a
spring trial date on plaintiffs' request for a permanent injunction.4
A few days after entering the preliminary injunction, the court issued
"supplemental and expanded" findings of fact on the evidence presented at the
hearing. The court noted that it had conducted an "extraordinary session" in
"recognition of the peril facing plaintiffs and plaintiff class with every passing
moment of this winter weather." 55
The court found all of the existing shelters consistently well over capacity.00
"[W]ith few exceptions," the court found, homeless people do not sleep "on the
street, in abandoned cars and buildings, in doorways, on park benches" by choice.
If safe, clean, accessible shelter were offered, they would use it "without hesitation,
willingly complying with any applicable rules and regulations. 5 7 The court
detailed the difficulty for homeless people in finding out what shelter space might
be available and in leaving their neighborhoods and finding transportation to
shelter and back.5 8
Finally, the court recounted the evidence of life and health-threatening perils in
the city-run shelters. While on the streets, homeless people suffered frostbite,
gangrene and burns (from the heat grates), hypothermia, and exacerbation of
other illnesses such as diabetes or asthma. In the shelters, they faced serious
physical injury from beatings and other assaults, rat bites, tuberculosis, and other
serious infectious diseases. 59 Toilets were stuffed up and overflowing; men slept in
urine on the floor; windows had been broken for months; showers did not work or
had no hot water; there were no sheets; and the few blankets provided were
laundered only once the previous winter. The results, said the court, were

because each new shelter was filled almost as soon as it was opened, the court ordered the District to keep
them open.
52. Id.
53. Id.; Atchison, Order (Jan. 13, 1989) (adjusting the order of Jan. 6, 1989).
54. Atchison, Preliminary Injunction Order (Jan. 6, 1989).
55. Atchison, Supplemental and Expanded Findings of Fact (Jan. 12, 1989).
56. Id. at 2-3.
57. Id. at 4.
58. Id. at 6-9.
59. Id. at 1-2.
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predictable: "Cots or mattresses and blankets retain blood and pus from open and
festering wounds, or vomit, phlegm, sputum and the like from those with illnesses
of short or long duration," to say nothing of mites, lice and other parasites.00 In
short, the court found, these shelters were "virtual hell-holes."',
The steps the District had taken in three and three-quarter years under
Initiative 17, said the court, were "executed so slowly and/or ineptly that they
create problems at least as bad as those they were meant to resolve; other such
steps were only taken in response to this lawsuit; and even those steps started
earlier are the classic example of 'too little and too late.' "I2 The court therefore
03
ruled that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their complaint.
Suddenly, beginning about March 2, 1989, the District stopped providing
evening meals in the shelters, claiming it lacked resources to provide both meals
and court-ordered shelter. CCNV brought a separate suit to enjoin the District
from discontinuing meal service without adequate notice and procedural
safeguards." Judge Emmett Sullivan granted a TRO regarding meal service,
citing the public interest and the likelihood that homeless families and individuals
could suffer immediate and irreparable injury.05 The court ordered the District to
continue serving meals until it posted written notice at the shelters of its plans to
cease meal service and provided reasonable opportunity for written comments. The
city was forced to continue meal service for several months because it failed
properly to comply with these procedural requirements. However, when the
District finally did comply, the court permitted the cessation of shelter meal
service."

On April 14, 1989, the parties appeared for trial on the permanent injunction.
With the court's help, however, they instead met to negotiate a settlement spelling
out the District's obligation to provide emergency shelter. The parties wrote a
detailed proposed consent decree that set out specific, objectively measurable
requirements for compliance with Initiative 17. A Final Order issued by Judge

60. Id. at 5.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 9.
63. Id. at 10.
64. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Barry, No. 89-CA2722 (D.C. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 18,
1989).
65. Letter from the Court to Counsel Enclosing Corrected Copy of the Restraining Order, CCIV, No.
89-CA2722 (Mar. 30, 1989).
66. Praecipe Withdrawing Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction Without Prejudice (May 25.
1990).
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Taylor on June 27, 1989, adopted the parties' proposals, thus setting forth the
terms by which the District of Columbia would bring itself into compliance with
67
the Overnight Shelter Act.
2.

Provisions of the Consent Decree

To meet the mandate of Initiative 17, the city was required to meet the clearly
demonstrated need for shelter by keeping open its eleven existing overnight
homeless shelters. It could not close any shelter without the court's permission.
The city further agreed to bring each shelter into compliance with agreed-upon
standards-or to replace them with complying shelters in the same designated
areas-by October 1, 1989.8 The Consent Decree embodied these standards in a
series of provisions requiring regular maintenance and repair; daily cleaning;
commercial extermination services; showers with hot water and toilets in certain
ratios to shelter residents; supplies such as soap, lice shampoo and spray, clean
towels, and toilet paper; beds or cots with clean linens and blankets; and adequate
ventilation and space between beds. 69 These standards were intended to make
concrete Initiative 17's requirements that shelter, "to a reasonable degree,"
maintain, protect and support human health, be safe and sanitary, and have an
"atmosphere of reasonable dignity. ' 70
Initiative 17 required that shelters be "accessible." To ensure that homeless
persons both knew about available shelter, and were able to get to it, the Decree
required that the city take specific steps to "timely publicize" through fliers and
public service announcements, the location of all shelters, their availability to
walk-ins, and the time and location of available transportation."1 In addition, due
to long-standing problems in providing reliable transportation, the plaintiffs sought
to locate shelters in the areas where homeless persons were known to live. The
Final Order divided the city into five zones and required defendants to open, by
December 31, 1989, a shelter for at least twenty-five people in each shelterless
zone.

67.
Order].
68.
operated
different
69.

Atchison, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Final Order (June 27, 1989) [hereinafter Final

Final Order I 5. Defendants were specifically ordered to replace the emergency women's shelter
in the hallways of the District Building by Oct. 1, 1989, but were permitted to place the shelter in a
area. Id.
Final Order T 7.
70. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1981).
71. Final Order V 12.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

Obviously, "adequate" shelter implies that every person needing and seeking
shelter receives a bed. Although the District asserted that everyone who was
seeking shelter received it, the court, based on ample testimony by homeless
individuals, found that the overcrowded and unsafe shelter conditions prevented
people from going inside. It is extremely difficult, however, to assess the numbers
of currently unsheltered persons who need shelter. Plaintiffs could not then
document that the city should provide, for example 3,000 more shelter beds; nor
could the city deny such an assertion, even though the city was responsible for the
assessment.72 The agreement, therefore, provided a triggering mechanism to
increase the supply of permanent shelter space, based on demand at existing
shelters. Once any of the eleven existing shelters maintained an average occupancy
of ninety-five percent for a six-day period, the city was required to open another
complying permanent shelter with at least fifty beds in the same geographical
zone.73 The Order gave the city 150 days after the trigger went off to locate such
permanent shelter.
During that 150-day period, the city was required to provide sufficient
temporary shelter to meet the extra demand. To ensure provision of the emergency
beds, the city was to have in readiness, within 30 days of the date of the Final
Order, trailers or buildings to serve an additional 200 to 300 homeless people.
Although these "stand-by" beds did not have to meet the Final Order's standards
or be located in the same zone as the capacity shelter, the city agreed to provide
homeless men transportation from the most crowded of the existing men's shelters
to these beds and to make the temporary women's shelter "accessible."
The decree sought to address various of the concerns about the shelters by (1)
establishing a system for monitoring and resolving complaints about disrespect and
abuse of homeless persons by shelter and security staff; (2) requiring that all
shelters be available to walk-ins; (3) mandating that shelters be open from 7:00
p.m. to 7:00 a.m. daily; and (4) placing a premium on personal privacy and
limiting intrusive questioning of residents.7 4 And, because personal security for
one's self and one's belongings was so important to the homeless population-those
with so few possessions can ill-afford to lose them-the decree required that

72. The Mayor was required under Initiative 17 to assess annually "the numb-r of homeless prsons
desiring overnight shelter and to determine current shelter availability and adequacy." D C CODE A.,% § 3604 (1981). The Mayor never made these assessments.
73. Final Order 1 8. Defendants were obligated to open 50 additional men's shelter spaces if the
capacity shelter was for men and 25 additional women's shelter spaces if the capacity shelter %%asfor women.
74. Final Order 7(i).
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adequate staff and secure storage for belongings be provided.70
Finally, the order provided methods of tracking the use of the city's shelters and
the defendants' compliance with the terms of the Final Order. Defendants were
required to provide plaintiffs their shelter census reports and allow plaintiffs'
representatives to conduct bi-monthly inspections of the shelters.7"
3.

Monitoring and Enforcing Compliance

As soon as the Final Order was issued, plaintiffs began to monitor the city's
compliance. Bi-monthly inspections of the eleven existing shelters usually occurred
unannounced and late at night, in order to directly observe and document
violations. Plaintiffs also undertook independent head counts as a check on
defendants' shelter census reports and to determine whether additional shelters
were required under the triggering mechanism of the Final Order. Almost
immediately, it became evident that the District was not going to comply with the
Consent Decree it had negotiated. On August 28, 1989, plaintiffs filed their first
contempt motion, supported by the monitors' affidavits and the city's own shelter
census reports.7 The contempt motion cited defendants' general lack of
cooperation with the Final Order and numerous specific violations, including
defendants' failure to provide additional shelter beds as required by the triggering
mechanism. Defendants failed to have available, by the end of July, trailers or
buildings capable of sheltering an additional 200 to 300 homeless people.
Defendants also failed to publicize adequately the availability of shelters. At one
shelter, they failed to enforce security, rendering it unfit for use. In October 1989,
while the August contempt motion was pending, plaintiffs filed another contempt
motion, alleging that the city failed to bring seven of its shelters up to the minimal
78
standards set forth in the Final Order.
At an October 3, 1989, hearing on outstanding contempt issues, 79 Judge Taylor
found that, "beyond any reasonable doubt," defendants had failed to "timely
publicize" the locations of shelters and availability of transportation in contempt of

75. Final Order I 7(m).
76. Final Order 11 13, 14.
77. Atchison, Plaintiffs' first Motion for Contempt was dated nune pro tune (May 30, 1989).
78. Atchison, Supplemental Motion for Contempt (Oct. 2, 1989).
79. The court did not hold the city in contempt for some items plaintiffs raised in their reply papers,
rather than in their original papers. Atchison, Order at 1-2 (Oct. 14, 1989). Those issues were later resolved In
the Dec. 21, 1989, contempt order, discussed infra note 82.
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the Final Order.80
On December 21, 1989, the court issued a sweeping order granting all of
plaintiffs' outstanding contempt motions.81 Based on evidence presented in
hearings on October 3, 12, and 13, the court found that plaintiffs had shown
"beyond any reasonable doubt" (or "by clear and convincing evidence in some
instances") that the city had violated the Final Order's requirements for 200 to
300 "stand-by" shelter beds; a complaint system; the provision of secure storage
space for residents; clean towels; numerous specific repair, maintenance and supply
provisions, from lack of blankets and sheets in some shelters to leaking ceilings and
broken windows and lack of showers in others; and the requirement to open
additional permanent shelter spaces under the triggering mechanism in two areas
for men and one for women.8 2 The court found that the District's compliance with
"its own agreement" incorporated in the Final Order
has been sporadic and tardy-frequently coerced under threat of contempt or
other court action. Its violations of that Order are flagrant and inexcusable.
Each such violation threatens the health and safety of homeless citizens of the
District of Columbia; in combination with each other and with unquestionably
foreseeable natural forces, the violations constitute an imminent danger to
83
those citizens' very lives. Strong measures are required.
The court then employed "strong measures." It ordered the District to pay daily
fines, totaling up to $30,000 per day, plus plaintiffs' reasonable attorneys' fees and
expenses incurred in bringing the contempt motions. The fines were:
1. $5,000 per day until defendants properly publicized shelter locations,
availability and transportation.
2. $5,000 per day until defendants provided trailers or buildings for the
temporary shelter of 200 to 300 homeless people and transportation to such
shelters.

80. Atchison, Order at 3 (Oct. 11, 1989). The court postponed until December any ruling on the
remaining issues and the imposition of any penalties.
81. Atchison, Contempt Order (Dec. 21, 1989) [hereinafter "Contempt Order").
82. The latter ruling was based on plaintiffs' Third Motion for Contempt, filed on November 30. 1989.
That motion alleged defendants' failure to open additional permanent shelter spaes under the triggering
mechanism of the Final Order in Area 5 by November 5. 1989, for men, in Area 2 by No;cmber 12, 1989. for
men, and for women anywhere, by November 9, 1989. The city never even responded to that motion. See
Atchison, Memorandum Opinion at 8 (Dec. 21, 1989).
83. Contempt Order T 8.
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3. $2,500 per day until defendants maintained the required number of beds at
each shelter.
4. $2,500 per day until defendants closed the women's District Building shelter
and replaced it with one that met the standards of the Final Order.
5. $2,500 per day until defendants established and posted an effective
grievance system for complaints against shelter staff and guards.
6. $1,500 per day until defendants provided secure overnight storage for every
client's belongings.
7. $1,000 per day until defendants provided a clean bath towel to every shelter
client.
8. $5,000 per day until Defendants brought existing shelters into compliance
with the standards articulated in the Final Order.
9. $5,000 per day until Defendants opened 100 additional permanent spaces
84
for men and 25 for women.
The daily fines began to accrue on December 26, 1989.11 All fines were to be
paid within five days of accrual and placed into a special fund for the benefit of
homeless single or "unattached" people in the District of Columbia.88
The Contempt Order documented the city's failure to comply with every
substantive portion of the Consent Decree to which it had agreed just eight months
earlier. The court clearly intended to induce compliance with the "strong
measures" imposed in its Contempt Order. Yet, despite the heavy fines, defendants
still failed to comply.
Accordingly, on December 28, 1989, plaintiffs filed a Fourth Motion for
Contempt based on the city's failure to respond to the triggering mechanism of the
Final Order when another of the original eleven shelters reached capacity. Again,
on January 16, 1990, plaintiffs filed a motion to determine and compel payments
of contempt fines. 87 The city argued that it was in substantial compliance with the
majority of the Contempt Order mandates and should pay only $11,500 per day.
The court determined that the city had come into partial compliance and reduced
the contempt fines accordingly, to $15,000 per day.8 8 Defendants were ordered to

84. Contempt Order 1 10-13.
85. Id.
86. Id. 1 14.
87. Plaintiffs claimed that $22,500 of defendants' daily fines could be determined solely on the basis of
undisputed affidavits, which indicated continuing violations of nearly all provisions of the Contempt Order.
Additional fines owing were based on disputed facts concerning the number of available beds at two shelters.
Plaintiffs were able to challenge defendants' figures through use of their inspectors' reports.
88. Atchison, Memorandum Opinion and Order (Feb. 20, 1990). The court further ordered defendants
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pay $280,000, the difference between the amount owed and that already paid. 80
The fines were later reduced to $10,000 and then $5,000 per day, based on the
city's affidavits of partial compliance.
Thus, the city did comply with some discrete portions of the Final Order and
chipped away at the assessed fines. Nevertheless, for a year and a half it continued
to pay from $5,000 to $10,000 per day-in all, $4 million in contempt fines, until
Initiative 17 was repealed. 90 Arguably this sum could have bought full compliance
with the Consent Decree.
B. Families: Fountain v. Barry
The District did no better at complying with the Family Shelter Act. The
statutory deadline for moving families out of the notorious hotel shelters was
March 11, 1989, two months after the court granted the preliminary injunction in
Atchison v. Barry. The District ignored that mandate. Long after this deadline,
more than two hundred families (including more than four hundred children)
languished in hotel shelters. District spending on hotel shelters increased to more
than $10 million in 1989.9'
In February 1990, advocates filed a class action, Fountain v. Barry,2 in D.C.
Superior Court, seeking to compel the District to comply with its obligations under
the Family Shelter Act. In a March 1990 hearing on plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction, plaintiffs presented gripping testimony from several
families,9 3 detailing the harmful effects of living in overcrowded hotels and having
to travel to a central meal facility."'
to submit affidavits regarding their future compliance with the Contempt Order by March 2 1990.
89. Meanwhile, on January 29, 1990, the plaintiffs filed their fifth Motion for Contempt based on
defendants' failure to provide additional permanent beds in some of the shelterless zones. The parties settled
this motion on March 5, 1990, in an Approved Settlement Agreement after renegotiating the number of beds
to be provided in certain zones.
90. See discussion of repeal infra pp. 65-66.
91.

COMMITTEE ON HUMAN SERVICES. COUNCIL OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUM BiA. REPORT. AsmEND IEr

M. (May 3, 1990).
92. No. 90-CA1503 (D.C. Super. Ct. vacated Nov. 15, 1991), affld sub noma.Fountain v. Kelly. No 91CV1462 (D.C. Aug. 23, 1993), [hereinafter Fountain]. The Complaint also asserted causes of action under
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. See Fountain, Complaint 89-94 (filed Feb. 12, 1990).
93. Again a team of attorneys, legal assistants, and notaries public spent days and nights collecting
affidavits from families in the shelters.
94. Fountain, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 10-16 (Oct. 12, 1990). A nurse practitioner with
direct experience with families placed at the hotel shelters observed a high incidence of contagious diseases,
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Conceding that several hundred families were currently placed in rooms that did
not constitute apartment-style units, the District argued that "the influx of
homeless families into the District of Columbia since the Act was enacted, coupled
with financial restrictions stemming from other statutory or Court Ordered
obligations, have made strict compliance with the timetables impossible."' 0
Moreover, the District denied that families were suffering irreparable injury,
relying on testimony by the District's Administrator of Preventive Health Services
that there was "no serious threat" to the health of children placed in hotel
shelters. 9 After the hearing, D.C. Superior Court Judge Richard A. Levie
reserved decision for six months before issuing a preliminary injunction against the
District on October 12, 1990.11
In a seventy-page opinion accompanying the injunction, Judge Levie found that
the District had failed to comply with the "unambiguous, non-discretionary"
requirements of the Family Shelter Act and that injunctive relief was necessary to
prevent further irreparable injury. 8 Judge Levie opined that the District's reliance
on hotel shelters places children "in a living situation that fundamentally is
unhealthy-physically and emotionally." 9 The court also questioned how
compliance could be fiscally prohibitive "when the District already spends as much
as $65 per night per family for a hotel/motel room .

. .

. One need not hold a

degree in mathematics to realize that this amounts to approximately $2,000.00 per
month-an amount representing far more than most persons pay for monthly
mortgages."10 0 Judge Levie ordered the District to take whatever "immediate and

including respiratory illnesses, which she attributed to the overcrowded conditions and the repeated exposure
to inclement weather necessitated by travel to and from a central meal facility. Developmental delays in young
children also were attributed to the cramped confines of the hotel shelter rooms. Id. at 18-20.
95. Fountain, Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Class Certification and Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction and Declaratory Relief at 13. Documents submitted to the court, however, belied the
District's argument that an "influx" of families into the District of Columbia had occurred. Based on
information obtained from families applying for shelter, the District itself determined that only three percent
of families had moved to D.C. immediately prior to seeking shelter. See Defendants' Exhibit 28.
96. Fountain, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 20 (Oct. 12, 1990).
97. Meanwhile, in June 1990, the Council enacted the 1990 Amendment Act, amending both the
Overnight Shelter Act and the Family Shelter Act to state that "[n]othing in this act shall be construed to
create an entitlement in any homeless person or family to emergency shelter or support services." D.C. CODs
ANN. §3-609 (1981 & Supp. 1992). In August 1990 this amendment was stayed pending the outcome of a
referendum election on November 6, 1990. The course of the repeal of the right to shelter is traced Infra
section III.
98. Fountain, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 50, 59, 65 (Oct. 12, 1990).
99. Id. at 67.
100. Id. at 68.
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subsequent actions are necessary" to comply with the Family Shelter Act within
ninety days, beginning with a report detailing specific actions and timetables for
implementation.1"'
In the Fountain Implementation Plan submitted to the court on November 9,
1990, the District announced a plan to acquire approximately 300 apartment-style
units and to relocate the families placed in hotels by January 1991. The District
also filed a Notice of Appeal and moved before Judge Levie, pursuant to Rule
60(b)(5),102 for a stay pending its appeal of the October order.

IV.

ENDING THE "RIGHT TO SHELTER"

A. Backgroundfor the Repeal of Initiative 17
In the face of judicial enforcement of the right to shelter for both families and
single adults, the Council decided simply to abolish the right. The executive
branch of the District government, having been in contempt of the Atchison
consent decree almost from the outset, had apparently made a decision to pay
substantial daily fines rather than comply with its own promises. It then used the
expenditure represented by those fines to pressure the legislative branch to repeal
the laws.
In June 1990 the Council complied. It voted to repeal Initiative 17 and to end
the entitlement to shelter in the District of Columbia. Council members attributed
the vote to the need to reduce city spending in tight budgetary times, expressing
10 3
their belief that Initiative 17 "was strangling [the city] financially."
The desire to avoid further contempt fees in Atchison and potentially similar
fees in Fountain was clearly a motivating factor behind the repeal of Initiative 17.
Just before bringing the 1990 amendment up for consideration as an "emergency"

101. Judge Levie also granted plaintiffs' motion for class certification and denied defendants' motion to
dismiss plaintiffs' federal claims and motion to stay proceedings. Id. at 71-72. Judge Levie rejected the
District's motion to stay proceedings in light of the uncertain fate of the right to shelter, noting that some type
of injunctive relief "will still be appropriate even if the 1990 Act becomes law." Id. at 70.
102. Rule 60 provides, inter alia, that "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the Court may
relieve a party from a[n] ... order for the following reasons: ... (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released,
or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed, or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application" D C Ru.Es A.,. Super. Ct. Civ. R.
60(b)(5) (1992).
103. Abramowitz, Council Lops 10o Off Property Ta Members Sidestep Spending Cuts Barry
Sought, End Mandatory Shelter for Homeless, WASsmNG'roN PosT, June 27, 1990, at G1, col. 2.
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bill, 104 sponsor H.R. Crawford wrote a memorandum to his fellow Council
members, stating in part that "consideration of this legislation, on an emergency
basis, is necessitated by the fact that the District government is being held in
contempt of court and being fined over $5,000 per day... in the Atchison v. Barry
case." 10 5 Crawford also noted that his bill would amend the Family Shelter Act to
"make clear that no 'right' or 'entitlement' was intended ... by its passage" and
added that this amendment had been requested by the city's legal counsel "to
clarify the intent of the Council when it enacted that law, and .. .avoid any
additional contempt or fine payments in the Fountain v. Barry case."' 00
The "entitlement" to shelter had thus become the villain. City officials
maintained that it was only homeless persons' ability to demand shelter, as a
matter of right, that prevented the city from using more enlightened solutions to
provide more services, or even to end homelessness. These arguments went
unchallenged in the press and in the halls of government. After a hiatus while
voters affirmed the action through the referendum process, the Council's new
statute ultimately became law.
B.

The New Overnight Shelter Amendment Act

Initiative 17 was a model of legislative simplicity. It guaranteed a basic right
and provided for judicial enforcement. The Atchison consent decree demonstrated
that the statute's terms were easy to understand and define. In contrast, the new
law is a complex maze of restrictions and limitations designed to prevent, rather
than create, any remedy.
The law, enacted as the "District of Columbia Overnight Shelter Amendment
Act of 1990," flatly states that "[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to
create an entitlement of any homeless person or family to emergency overnight
shelter or support services.' 0 7 The 1990 amendments replaced Initiative 17's

104. The designation of any D.C. legislation as an "emergency" bill entitles it to be put into effect
immediately for up to 90 days, avoiding the usual congressional review period for D.C. laws. See D.C. CODE
ANN. § 1-229(a) (1981). At the time of Councilmember Crawford's memorandum, the Council had been
considering proposals to limit the right to shelter for more than one year.
105. See Memorandum of Councilmember H.R. Crawford to All Councilmembers on Emergency
Legislation - Bill 8-156 at I (June 15, 1990).
106. Id.
107. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-609(a) (1981 & Supp. 1992). The 1990 amendments limited any
requirement by the District to provide transportation to or from emergency shelters or other services. See Id.
§ 3-609(b). The statute also amended sections of the District's Emergency Shelter Family Services Program.
See id. §§ 3-206.3 to -206.9, including the addition of an express statement that families have no entitlement
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"declaration of policy" that the District would provide "adequate overnight shelter
to all homeless persons ...
requesting such shelter . . . 138 with a much less
generous "statement of policy," providing only that homeless persons who meet
certain statutory requirements are "eligible to apply" 10 0 for shelter and social

services.
The statute retains Initiative 17's definition of homelessness, defining as
"homeless" people or families who lack a "possessory interest in a housing
accommodation" and are unable to immediately acquire housing.110 Regulations",,
defining this standard limit shelter programs to the most indigent District citizens,
by excluding from the definition of "homeless" any person who has financial
resources of more than $100, has a credit card that can be used to obtain housing,
or has income or resources that exceed the eligibility standards for the District's
emergency assistance program."1
The regulations establish an intake and
screening process, and require homeless applicants to document their eligibility for
shelter services by providing information about their employment history, sources
of income, and reasons for seeking shelter. 1
The 1990 amendments permit the District to deny or stop providing shelter to
certain categories of homeless adults, including those who are able to work or to

to emergency shelter or support services. See id. § 3-206.9.
108. Id. § 3-602 (1981) (repealed March 6, 1991, D.C. Law 8-197. § 2(b), 37 D.C. Reg. 4815).
109. Id. § 3-601 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
110. Id. § 3-603(5)(A). Individuals and families are also "homeless" within the meaning of the statute
if they have a "possessory interest" in housing but have been barred from that housing, or if ocupation of the
housing would be "likely to lead to violence." Id. § 3-603(5)(B),(C).
111. The 1990 amendments required the Mayor to promulgate rules concerning certain aspects of the
statute. See id. § 3-608. The city's Department of Human Services (DHS) first issued a set of' "emergency
and proposed rules" in May 1991 and, after receiving public comment, issued a second set of proposed rules in
September 1991. District of Columbia Department of Human Services, Notice of Emergency and Proposed
Rulemaking, 38 D.C. Reg. 5735 (1991). On October 31. 1991, Council Chairman John Wilson introduced
Proposed Resolution 9-240, which would approve the proposed rules. Id. at 6913. A Public Roundtable on the
regulations was held on December 9, 1991. Final rules became effective upon their publication in the D.C.
Register on January 24, 1992. See 39 D.C. Reg. 470-91 (1992) (to be codified at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29.
§ 2500 et seq.).
112. 38 D.C. Reg. 5738-39 (1991). See also emergency assistance eligibility standards at DC CODE
ANN. § 3-1008 (1981 & Supp. 1992). (The maximum amount of net monthly income or resources permitted
under these standards for one person is S721.25; a family of four is permitted up to S1,456.25 net per month.)
The regulations promulgated by the city to implement Initiative 17 did not include financial eligibility for
emergency assistance as a criteria for eligibility for the shelter program. These regulations did, howaever, deny
eligibility to those persons with more than SI00 or with a credit card that could be used to obtain temporary
housing. See 36 D.C. Reg. 1064 (codified at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2501.2 (Feb. 3. 1989) (repealed
1991)).
113. 38 D.C. Reg. 5740-41 (1991).
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accept vocational training, but who "continuously refuse" to accept employment or
training; who refuse to accept permanent housing accommodations; refuse to
accept social services assistance or "cooperate with" social services personnel; who
have not enrolled or will not enroll their children in school; who have been evicted
from housing or expelled from city shelters as a result of drug use; and who have
accepted overnight shelter and obtained housing with city assistance, but
11 4
subsequently have been evicted from such housing due to nonpayment of rent.
The city may also require any applicant to undergo a physical examination,
including a urinalysis test, if a trained social worker has a "reasonable suspicion"
that the applicant has engaged in "prolonged drug use." Homeless people who test
positive for drug use may be required to receive substance abuse treatment while
in the shelter program, and may be immediately expelled from the program if they
fail to comply with counseling or treatment requirements." 5 Those who are denied
shelter or terminated from shelter programs may pursue an administrative appeals
process and ultimately take their cases to the D.C. Court of Appeals."'0
The 1990 statute limits the length of time a homeless person or family may stay
in shelter accommodations. Homeless people are limited to thirty cumulative days
of shelter during a one-year period, and homeless families can receive no more
than ninety consecutive days of emergency shelter annually."' In addition, the
statute suggests, and the regulations state explicitly, that an individual or a family
may receive shelter only once during a twelve-month period.11 8 The city may grant
either an extension of up to thirty days or a one-time exception to these limits
when a family is unable to secure permanent housing "despite the best efforts of
the [city] and the homeless family"'1 9 or when "special conditions" exist that
could "endanger the health or safety" of a homeless individual or family.1 20 Days

114. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-605(b) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
115. Id. § 3-602.1(7)(g),(h),
116. Id. § 3-606; see also 38 D.C. Reg. 5751-53 (1991).
117. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-610 (1981 & Supp. 1992). See also 38 D.C. Reg. 5743 (1991).
118. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-610(b)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1992), stating that the city may grant an
exception to "the one-time provision of emergency overnight shelter and support services in a 12-month
period" without having explicitly stated that there is a one-time limit. See also 38 D.C. Reg, 5738 (1991) (An
applicant for shelter is eligible if the applicant "[h]as not previously received temporary family housing and
support services or emergency overnight shelter and support services for individual adults within the previous
three hundred and sixty-five (365) days").
119. 38 D.C. Reg. 5743 (1991). There is no similar provision exempting from the durational limits
homeless "individuals" who have been unsuccessful in finding permanent housing.
120. Id. Homelessness itself does not constitute a "special condition" within the meaning of the
regulations. Id.
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spent in shelters or other temporary housing when the temperature is below 26
121
degrees are not included in these durational limits.
The statute requires homeless adults to pay thirty percent of their gross monthly
income for shelter and support services. 12 2 These fees, however, are neither rent
nor actual contributions to shelter costs. Rather, they are a kind of forced savings
in which the District takes "contributions" from homeless people and then returns
these monies when the homeless person leaves the shelter system. Implementing
regulations state that the city will demand this contribution only for periods in
which the homeless family or person earns or receives income and only when such
income is "actually available" to the homeless person.121 The regulations require
individual shelter providers to collect housing fees, give homeless persons written
receipts for the fees, and forward the fees to the city Department of Human
Services (DHS). 24 DHS is responsible for maintaining these funds in an interestbearing bank account for each homeless person or family and for returning the
funds to homeless people "immediately" upon their leaving the emergency shelter
program. 125 The regulations do not specify, however, how a shelter provider will
determine when a homeless person or family is earning income or has income
available, how to determine a homeless person's exit from the shelter program, the
procedure by which funds will be returned to homeless people upon leaving the
program, or what redress is available to a homeless person if the funds are not
126

returned.

Homeless people who are unable to pay for their shelter must provide one hour
of community service for each night temporary shelter is provided. 21 The location,
type, and number of community service hours are to be determined by a case
manager and approved by DHS's Office of Emergency Shelter and Support
Services. 28

121. Id.; see also D.C. Frigid Temperature Protection Amendment Act of 1988. DC CODE ANN § 3621 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
122. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-605.1 (1981 & Supp. 1992); see also 38 D.C. Reg. 5746-48 (1991). Adults
who receive Aid to Families with Dependent Children or General Public Assistance benefits are exempted
from the "contribution" requirement. Id. at 5746-47.
123. 38 D.C. Reg. 5747 (1991).
124. Id. Presumably, each shelter provider would also be responsible for determining whether a
homeless person is actually earning or receiving income, and whether such fees are "actually available."
125. Id.
126. Several families have reported to the Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless that shelter
providers are refusing to return escrow funds even after the families have morved out.
127. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-605.1(c) (1981 & Supp. 1992); 38 D.C. Reg. 5747-48 (1991).
128. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-605.1(c) (1981 & Supp. 1992); 38 D.C. Reg. 5748 (1991).
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The 1990 amendments indicate that the city will assist homeless families and
individuals in finding permanent housing, but put the primary burden of the
housing search on homeless people themselves. 129 Regulations require the city to
assign case managers to homeless families, and charge these case managers with
creating case plans (which may include a variety of services) and assisting in their
implementation."10 Although the 1990 statute states that the city will provide
services for both individuals and families, 1"' the regulations do not mention direct
services for homeless people. Rather, they state only that the city will refer

13 2
individuals to services "as requested or considered necessary."
Although the 1990 statute and regulations impose many conditions on homeless
persons' use of the District shelter system, the law omits Initiative 17's qualitative
standards for District shelters, including the mandate that shelter care be provided
"in an atmosphere of reasonable dignity,""' and regulatory standards of
accessibility, health maintenance and physical requirements.3"

C. The Attempt to Stop Repeal of Initiative 17
1. Litigation

The Atchison plaintiffs challenged the Council's power to repeal a law drafted
and passed by voter initiative. They argued that, although the voters may stop the
Council from acting by exercising their direct referendum power and may override
the Council's inaction by exercising their direct initiative power, there is no

129. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-602(c)(4) (1981 & Supp. 1992); 38 D.C. Reg. 5749 (1991). ("Adult
members of homeless families and single individuals shall search for housing on their own initiative, regardless
of the availability of housing subsidies or public housing units, or the Department's efforts to provide
assistance.")
130. 38 D.C. Reg. 5748-49 (1991). The case plan for a homeless family may address issues of
employment, housing services, substance abuse screening, mental health services, public benefits program
applications, health services, child care, and school enrollment or transfer for school-aged children. Id. at
5748.
131. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-602.1(c)(2)-(c)(7) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
132. 38 D.C. Reg. 5749 (1991). This change followed by weeks the Johnson v. Dixon case, discussed
infra p. 81-86, during which the District was forced to admit that it offered little in the nature of social
services to single persons in District shelters.
133. D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-601 (1981 & Supp. 1992). See also 36 D.C. Reg. 1064 (codified at D.C.
Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2599.11) (repealed 1991).
134. See 36 D.C. Reg. 1064 (codified at D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, § 2599.1) (repealed 1991). The
Family Shelter Act, discussed supra p. 52, still requires that family shelters be in "substantial compliance"
with housing regulations. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-206.3 (b)(2) (1981 & Supp. 1992).
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commensurate provision of law permitting the Council to override legislative acts
of the people.135 Judge Taylor rejected that argument, and the D.C. Court of
Appeals affirmed. 8' The court held that the Council has "plenary" authority and
legislative power "coextensive" with that of the people. What the one can do, the
1 37

other can undo.

2.

The Ballot Box

Advocates for the homeless responded to the proposed 1990 amendments with
the strategy that served them well in 1984: a ballot initiative ensuring the right to
shelter. In 1990, however, the results were different. CCNV and other Initiative 17
supporters obtained enough signatures to place a referendum to override the

amendments on the November 1990 ballot
support their cause.

39

s

and raised approximately $45,000 to

These actions prevented the 1990 amendments from taking

effect until the referendum vote was held. When that vote took place, however,
District voters

135.
136.
137.
138.
as follows:

rejected

the

referendum,

"No.

005,"

by

the

narrowest

See D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281 (1981).
Atchison v. Barry, 585 A.2d 150 (D.C. 1991).
Id. at 154-157.
The summary and text of Referendum 005, as it appeared on the November. 1990 D.C. ballot, is
Summary Statement

Referendum #005 rejects the 1990 Act that changes the current Right to O-ernight Shelter Law
("Initiative 17")
The 1990 Act changes the current law ("Initiative 17") by.
- Removing the entitlement "right" of homeless persons to overnight shelter
- Establishing a program (but no entitlement) for shelter and support services-for the homeless;
- Defining eligibility for receiving shelter, grounds for denying shelter, limits on the length of stay,
participation in costs by shelter occupants, and other requirements.
Vote "FOR" Referendum #005 to reject the 1990 Act and retain the current law.
Vote "AGAINST"' Referendum #005 to permit the 1990 Act to become law.
Legislative Text
By the electors of the District of Columbia,
To reject the D.C. Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990 (D.C. Act 8-228) and preserve
the right to shelter as it was established by the voters in Initiative 17. Initiative 17 is cited as the District of
Columbia Right to Overnight Shelter Act of 1984 (D.C. Law 5-146).
BE IT RESOLVED BY THE ELECTORS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, that the D.C.
Emergency Overnight Shelter Amendment Act of 1990 (D.C. Act 8-228) is rejected and Initiative 17 is
preserved.
139. Wheeler, A Test of D.C.'s Policy on the Homeless, WASHINGTON PosT, Nor. 4, 1990. at B7, cl.
3.
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margin-approximately two percentage points, or 3,179 votes. 140 The amendments
were then on their way to becoming law."
In many ways, the debate on Referendum 005 was an echo of the Initiative 17
campaign. Referendum opponents asserted that restoration of the "right to
shelter" would "produce an open-ended 'blank check' shelter program,.., give the
emergency shelter program absolute priority over all other human services
programs .... " and "overturn ... necessary and reasonable reforms of Initiative
17. ''14a Opponents characterized the amendments as a vehicle to create a

"compassionate, comprehensive program to help the homeless ... to bring D.C.'s

chaotic emergency shelter program under control . . . to improve our
neighborhoods ... to take control of emergency shelters back from the courts and
from the radical homeless activists ... to provide proper care for homeless people
who are alcoholics, drug abusers or mentally ill . . . [and] to help shelter clients

acquire a sense of responsibility. ' 'l 4s These arguments were widely made,
notwithstanding that the proposed law did nothing to create any program to help
the homeless.
In contrast, proponents of Referendum 005 asserted that the high cost of the
shelter program was not attributable to Initiative 17, but to the city's operation of
that program. Proponents charged that the shelter program was replete with
mismanagement and waste, including the granting of lucrative city contracts to
44
politically well-connected private shelter operators.1
In addition to alleging waste in the family programs, referendum proponents
pointed to the substandard shelter conditions for single people challenged in

140. Voters in five of the city's eight wards voted in favor of the referendum, and two other wards
defeated the referendum by less than 1,000 votes. In Ward 3, however, the District's most affluent ward,
voters rejected Referendum 005 by more than 7,000 votes. Approximately 24% of D.C. citizens voting in the
1990 election did not cast a vote on the referendum. See Wheeler, 005 Felled by Voters In Ward 3,
WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 15, 1990, at DC8, col. 1.
141. The law still had to survive the congressional layover period, see supra note 104; See also D.C
CODE ANN. § 1-233 (c)(l) (1981). Ultimately, the amendments became law on March 6, 1991.
142. See CITIZENS AGAINST 005 PAMPHLET, VOTE AGAINST 005: IMPROVE SHELTER PROGRAMS AND
YOUR NEIGHBORHOODS 1,2 (1990).

143.

Id.

144.

See COMMITTEE TO SAVE INITIATIVE

17. IN NOVEMBER, VOTE FOR REFERENDUM 005: SAVE

INITIATIVE 17. THE RIGHT TO OVERNIGHT SHELTER AcT 1 (1990) ("District officials ... certainly spent more
than enough of our money, but they gave it not to the homeless, but to the politicians' buddies who
conveniently became shelter operators. For instance, under one contract the City pays for apartment units at a
rate of $2,800 a month per unit, even though the landlord leases units to non-City contract tenants at a rate of
$400 a month.").
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AtchisonY.45 Proponents characterized the 1990 amendments as an effort by the
District to avoid cleaning up the shelter program and expressed skepticism at the
contention that the city intended to continue to shelter the homeless or to establish
any program to end homelessness, if the 1990 amendments survived a referendum
challenge. Without Initiative 17, they asserted, "people will die on the streets of
Washington, and your taxes will not be lowered." 140
As in the battle over Initiative 17, the District government took a public but
arguably illegal role in the debate over Referendum 005. In October 1990 the city
advocated the defeat of the referendum in a two-page pamphlet 4 7 and a "special
edition" of its newsletter."4 These materials characterized the 1990 amendments
as an attempt to "better serve those suffering from the human tragedy of
homelessness."'148 The city described Initiative 17 as an "invitation for homeless
people from around the region to come to the District for shelter on demand" and
asserted that passage of Referendum 005 would render the city "unable to manage
its programs responsibly and attack the causes of. ..homelessness."'110 The city
was forced to withdraw these materials after CCNV and D.C. Common Cause
obtained a federal court ruling, one week before the election, holding that the
city's actions violated earlier decisions that forbade the District from using public
funds to influence voter opinion on Initiative 17.'1'
In the end, however, the proponents lost. To date, there has been no
comprehensive post-mortem on why Referendum 005 was defeated. In a December
1990 survey of 400 D.C. citizens who voted in the November 1990 election,1 5a 36
percent of respondents said they had voted against the referendum. The primary
reasons given by these voters for their opposition included the belief that (1)
Referendum 005 would cost the city too much money; (2) the referendum would
have forced the District to spend its resources "warehousing" homeless persons in
shelters rather than providing other types of assistance; (3) the referendum would
145. Id.
146. Id. at 3.

147. D.C. DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES. HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE TiIROUGll DIFFICULT TIMES
(Oct. 1990)[hereinafter HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE].
148. D.C. Department of Human Services newsletter. Did You Know?. Vol. 9. No. I (Oct. 1990).
149. Id. at 2.
150. HELPING HOMELESS PEOPLE, supra note 147, at 1.
151. See District of Columbia Common Cause v. District of Columbia. No. 85-3528 (D.D.C. Oct. 30.
1990) (temporary restraining order); see also discussion of the city's actions in 1984, supra pp. 6-8 and
accompanying notes. See also Goldberg, Judge Disallows Anti-Shelter Leaflets. WAsnNGToN Ti'a.s. Oct. 31.
1990, at B5, col. 2.
152. Balden and Russonello, D.C. Voter Survey Regarding Homelessness (Mar. 1991).
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result in attracting homeless people from other parts of the country to receive
shelter in the District; 6 " and (4) the needs of homeless people should be not be put
above the needs of other deserving persons in the District. 15 At the same time,
however, seventy-two percent of respondents agreed with the statement that "[a]ll
homeless people should be guaranteed a safe place to sleep." 1 5 More than twothirds indicated that they believed the District could afford to provide shelter for
"all homeless people" if shelter programs were better managed, 6 6 and fifty-one
percent indicated that they believed the District government was not doing enough
to help the homeless.1 "'

IV.

A.

IMPACT OF ENDING THE RIGHT TO SHELTER

Effect of New Law and Implementing Regulations

The 1990 amendments and their implementing regulations reject both the letter
and the spirit of Initiative 17 by creating a system focused on the limits of the
city's willingness and ability to assist the homeless. For example, the regulations
describe individual and family shelter in terms of what is "available"1 and
explicitly refuse to grant homeless people a "fair hearing" if they are denied
shelter or services as a result of "funding limitations."1 59 In contrast to Initiative
17's promise of shelter to any District resident who seeks it, the 1990 statute
clearly evidences a preference for certain, perhaps more politically popular,
homeless people-families, and individuals who are free of substance-abuse
problems, willing to follow the rules and willing to show their gratitude for the
provision of shelter and related services-over single adults, drug users, and people
153. Forty-eight percent of those who voted against the referendum stated that the District's right to
shelter had resulted in persons moving to the District to obtain shelter, and 58 percent of all survey
respondents expressed this view. Id. at 3, 6, 12. A 1989 study found, however, that 81 percent of persons living
on the streets in the District had been District residents for at least one year, and noted other research
indicating that 67 percent to 74 percent of District shelter residents had lived in the city for at least one year.
See Dockett, Street People in the District of Columbia: Characteristics and Service Needs, at 45-49 (March,
1989). See also statistics introduced into evidence by the city in the Fountain case regarding the extremely
small percentage of families who moved to the District just prior to seeking shelter, discussed supra note 95.
154. D.C. Voter Survey Regarding Homelessness, supra note 152, at 3, 11-12.
155. Id. at 9.
156. Id. at 2, 5.
157. Id. at 3.
158. 38 D.C. Reg. 5735 (1991).
159. Id. at 5751.
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who refuse to cooperate with city agencies and shelter providers.
There seems to have been no consideration of the high cost of the new law's
approach to homelessness. The 1990 amendments ignore the administrative
burdens inherent in a system that continually questions whether and under what
circumstances District citizens are entitled to shelter and related services. For
example, because homeless people may not seek shelter in the same place from one
night to the next, some tracking system will be necessary if the District intends to
monitor length of stay, issue notices to those whose stay is about to expire,'c" and
enforce the durational limits. No tracking system is described in the 1990
amendments or implementing regulations, however. Similarly, the regulations are
silent on whether or how shelter providers will be informed of an initial DHS
determination of a homeless person's financial eligibility and service needs. 101
Further, no mechanism has been outlined in the 1990 law or its regulations for
determining whether a homeless person has income "available" to pay the fee for
shelter care, collecting and providing receipts for these fees, establishing and
maintaining bank accounts for homeless individuals, and ensuring that, upon
exiting from the shelter program, they receive whatever funds they have
contributed. These logistical and administrative barriers seem especially daunting
in light of reductions in the District's budget for homeless individuals and
families 6 ' and of reductions in the city's work force.
Finally, the 1990 amendments and regulations ignore weaknesses in the city's
current service delivery system. Through this law, the District has determined that
homeless people should remain in shelters only for a limited time, but has failed to
consider the question of where homeless persons are to go when their limited stay
ends. The law thus increases the likelihood that homeless individuals and families
will be turned out of city shelters and onto the streets. 0 3 In addition, although the

160. Regulations state that DHS will issue notification to homeless families at least one month prior to
the expiration of their length of stay. 38 D.C. Reg. 5743 (1991). There is no notification pro-ision in the
regulations for homeless individuals.
161. The regulations provide that DHS, through its intake workers, will determine whether an applicant
is "homeless" within the meaning of the statute and review applicants' needs for housing and services. See Id.
at 5739, 5741. See also D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-602.1(c) (1981 & Supp. 1992) (outlining responsibilities of the
coordinator of the District's shelter program).
162. The District budgeted 512 million for the 1992 fiscal year (October 1. 1991 to Septemb:r 30.
1992). It budgeted S21.6 million for the fiscal year that ended on October I. 1991. See Spolaro Uncertain Fate
of D.C.'s Homeless, VASHINGTON POST, Aug. 5, 1991, at D5, col. 5.
163. See. e.g.. id., at DI, col. 2 (describing the August. 1991 closing.of the Pierce and Trust Clinic
shelters for men, discussed infra 80-86 and accompanying notes 185-220, noting that the city had "no certain
solution" regarding where Pierce and Trust residents would live. "No new programs have been developed to
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city touted the 1990 amendments as a vehicle to ensure the provision of needed
services to homeless persons, the durational limits seem at cross-purposes with any
serious effort by case managers and other service providers to help homeless
persons conquer chronic unemployment, substance abuse, mental illness, and other
16
problems that may have contributed to their lack of shelter. 4
As of this writing, the District has apparently failed either to enforce the more
restrictive provisions of the 1990 amendments 16 5 or to develop permanent housing

or other services for homeless D.C. citizens. 66 The human cost of inadequacies in
the shelter system was noted in graphic terms on November 5, 1991, however,
18 7
when a homeless man died from exposure to the cold.
B.

Eliminating Gains Won in Litigation

1.

Atchison

Throughout the political battle on the 1990 amendments and the Referendum
005 campaign,168 the District was bound by the Atchison consent decree and could

provide substitute housing for singles or families," the article stated, "and they are not likely to find much
help in alternative low-income housing programs or in the city's public housing stock.") Some advocates have
urged the city to delay enforcement of the durational limits until alternative, permanent housing alternatives
are available. See, e.g., Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless, Comments on Proposed Regulations
Governing Temporary Housing for Families and Emergency Overnight Shelter for Individual Adults, at 20-21
(June 17, 1991). ("No limitation on length of stay should be enforced until the Department (of Human
Services] has a viable program to offer shelter residents. No such program exists at this time to ensure that
shelter residents have a reasonable opportunity to return to permanent housing within the timeframes of the
1990 Amendment Act.") (proposed regulations published at 38 D.C. Reg. 2875 (May 17, 1991)).
164. See Washington Legal Clinic for the Homeless comments, supra note 162, at 22. ("If time limits
are enforced as threatened, developing a case management plan will, in most instances, be an exercise in
futility.")
165. Escobar, Homeless Man in District Dies From Exposure to Cold, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 7,
1991, at D7, col. 3. ("Although now part of the law, it is not clear when the city will enforce the 30-day limit"
on shelter stays for individuals).
166. See A Matter of Timing, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 13, 1991 at AI, col. I (editorial criticizing
the District government for its failure to take previously-planned or recommended steps to provide housing or
other services for homeless persons). See also Sanchez, Plan to Shelter Homeless Bogged Down in District,
WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 18, 1991, at Cl, col.
5 (describing the District's decision, as a result of community
opposition, not to place 50 homeless families in two rented apartment buildings, leaving the buildings nearly
empty at a cost of $168,500 to the city. The article reported that 638 families were then living in D.C.
shelters).
167. Escobar, Homeless Man in District Dies, supra note 165, at DI, col. 5.
168. The D.C. Council's enactment of the emergency repeal of the right to shelter took effect
immediately. D.C. Act 8-226, 37 D.C. Reg. 4676-4675 (1990) ("Emergency Act"). Thus, the Emergency Act
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not ignore it with impunity. To seek to lift the decree was clearly premature
during this period, because the law had not actually changed until the
congressional layover period was complete-indeed, it might never change.
The tenor of the litigation, however, changed. One contempt motion remained
outstanding when the D.C. Council acted in June 1990. On July 17, 1990, after
the court had reduced the city's fines to $10,000 per day based on affidavits of
partial compliance, the court again held the city in contempt as urged in plaintiffs'
Fourth Motion for Contempt, filed the previous December.10 Rather than
imposing daily fines for the city's failure to open required shelter beds, the court
fined defendants the lump sum of $100,000 as a remedial sanction. 170 In view of
the Council's emergency repeal of Initiative 17, the plaintiffs did not press for
daily fines.
Although Initiative 17 remained the law until March 6, 1991, the plaintiffs
sought very little more in contempt sanctions and did not attempt to force the
opening of new shelters. They did attempt to prevent shelters from closing. The
District continued to pay fines until June 1991, when the decree was finally lifted.
On June 25, 1991, Judge Taylor vacated the Final Order in Atchison.171 In
addition, the court denied the one remaining contempt motion outstanding since
March 1, 1991, which had been based on defendants' failure to maintain sufficient
72
beds in one shelter.1
The final issue to be resolved was how to dispose of the accumulated contempt
fines, dedicated from the outset for the benefit of the homeless class. Ultimately,
the court granted plaintiffs' motion to place the contempt fine fund in the hands of
trustees for the benefit of the Atchison class. 7 a The court granted plaintiffs'
request to establish a trust to administer a loan fund to assist projects to build or

repealed the entitlement to shelter, but only for 90 days, since that is the life of an "emergency" law. DC
CODE ANN. § 1-229(a) (1981 & Supp. 1992). The Council simultaneously enacted a permanent repal, but
that law was suspended while the referendum was conducted in November 1990. Both the current state and
the future of the law were thus in doubt for several months.
169. Atchison, Order (July 17, 1990).
170. On July 20, 1990, the court ordered defendants to pay this S100,000 in a lump sum. Originally
responding to the city's claim that it could not pay that lump sum, the court had given defendants three days
to present an alternative payment plan; the city failed even to respond. Atchison, Order (July 20. 1990).
171. Atchison, Order (June 25, 1991).
172. Atchison, Order (June 27, 1991).
173. The court also ruled that defendants were not entitled to reimbursement of fines and declared moot
defendants' request that some fines be returned, since the city had never submitted any explanation for such a
request. Atchison, Order (Sept. 17, 1991).
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renovate affordable rental housing for single homeless people. 174 One important
legacy of this litigation, therefore, is the $4.4 million fund (including fines paid
and interest accrued) transferred from the court to the trustees for this purpose.17
2. Fountain
In the months after the entry of Judge Levie's October 12, 1990, order, the
District made only marginal efforts to increase the number of apartment-style
units, while the number of hotel shelter units remained about the same. The
District even converted the inaptly-named "Family Living Center," previously
used as an apartment-style facility, into a congregate shelter. More than sixty
families were crowded into twenty-one units, in which functioning cooking
facilities were dismantled. Some families returned to the street rather than remain
17 6
at the rat-infested and overcrowded facility.
In April 1991 Judge Levie advised the parties of his intention to grant the
District's Rule 60(b) motion for relief from his October 12, 1990, order upon
remand of the case from the Court of Appeals.1 77 On November 15, 1991, Judge
Levie vacated the preliminary injunction, relying on the "exhaustive" legislative
history of the 1990 Amendment Act and the language of the statute itself, which,
in the court's view, demonstrated that "the Council does not now, and did not
then, intend the Family Shelter Act to provide any entitlement to shelter or related
support services. ' 17 8 The court noted frequent legislative references to the
Atchison and Fountain cases, including a Committee on Human Services report
arguing that, without an amendment, "the courts will continue to embellish and
expand" the District's obligations to provide shelter and services to homeless
people. 17 9 In light of this "explicit" legislative history, Judge Levie discounted the
mandatory language of the Family Shelter Act and concluded that the District
was permitted discretion in providing shelter and services, consistent with its other
obligations and financial constraints.180

174. Atchison, Order (Nov. 21, 1991).
175. Id.
176. Under public pressure from advocacy groups, the District closed the Family Living Center in
January 1992.
177. Letter from Judge Richard A. Levie to Counsel (Apr. 26, 1991).
178. Fountain, Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7-8, 11 (Nov. 15, 1991).
179. Id. at 12.
180. Id. at 17 (Nov. 15, 1991). The court also concluded that it had erred in its earlier ruling that
plaintiffs had established a claim under the Social Security Act. Id. at 18.
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With the Fountain order vacated, prospects for homeless families dimmed. The
District's Fiscal Year 1992 Budget allowed for only 265 shelter spaces for families.
In January 1992, however, nearly 700 families were currently residing in District
shelters, with little hope that affordable housing would be made available to reduce
the need for family shelter.""" Indeed, given the cutbacks in Aid to Families with
Dependent Children benefit levels, the need for shelter likely will increase. 82
Families fortunate enough to have gained approval for shelter are sometimes told
by District officials that they will soon face termination, even if they have not
obtained housing. Despite these ominous forebodings, other District officials
maintain that they do not intend to dismantle the family shelter system.las
V. AFTER THE REPEAL OF THE RIGHT TO SHELTER. CJTBACK, COMMUNITY
OPPOSITION, AND HOMELESS PEOPLE AGAIN SLEEPING IN THE STREETS

In the months after Referendum 005's defeat, policies and actions of both the
executive and legislative branches reflected the sentiment that the District's
government need not take leadership or even responsibility for solving the problems
of the city's homeless, and that the development of shelters and other facilities for
homeless District residents should be controlled or eliminated to protect the
interests of communities who view these facilities as a threat to, and intrusion on,
their way of life.'"
181. Of that total, more than 400 families were living in "apartment style" facilities, with support
services ranging from intensive to non-existent.
182. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-205.52 (1981 & Supp. 1992) (reducing AFDC benefits 4.5% to 1989
levels). The AFDC cutback further reduces the ability of families to obtain housing in the private market. A
parent with two children receives $409 in AFDC monthly cash assistance. The average fair market rent for a
one-bedroom apartment in the District, as determined by HUD, is $725. and S854 for a two-bedrmom unit.
See HUD Schedule B - Fair Market Rents For Existing Housing, 57 Fed. Reg. 45468, 45477 (Oct. 1. 1992).
In July 1991, advocates filed suit in D.C. Superior Court in Quattlebaum v. Dixon. No. 91-8207. challenging
the cuts. Plaintiffs' motion for a temporary restraining order was denied. Judge Richard S. Salzman granted
plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on April 13, 1992.
183. Spolar, Toughest Cases on the Streets, WAsmNGTON PosT, Oct. 8, 1991, at B5. col. 3.
184. See Rosenfeld, Shelters in a Storm, \VASHINGTON PosT, Mar. 28. 1991, at DI, col. 1. This article
described a "subtle change" in the District's "emotional landscape" in the years since Initiative 17's passage.
and quoted extensively District residents who lived in neighborhoods in which homeless shelters had been
established and who opposed the development of shelters as a result of their experiences. The article quoted
residents who viewed shelters as having "caused nothing but problems," who related stories of litter and crime
attributed to shelter residents, who complained that the alleys of their neighborhoods "smell like urinals" and
who asserted that the city government had been indifferent to their concerns. The article did not quote any
advocates or service providers for the homeless. Only one homeless person was quoted, but he was depicted as
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A.

The District's Decision to Close Two Shelters

The Mayor's Fiscal Year 1992 Budget forewarned of drastic cuts in the
District's shelter program. The budget halved funds for the public shelter system,
with a projected reduction of more than 800 shelter beds for single people.18 0
While the Mayor steadfastly refused to reveal publicly which shelters would be
closed, several community groups clamored for shelters in their neighborhoods to
be shut down.""6 In early July 1991 the District publicly announced plans to close
two privately operated shelters for homeless men, effective August 10, 1991.187
The two shelters to be closed provided overnight beds for a total of 277 homeless
men. The Pierce School Shelter, located in Northeast Washington, housed 150
men. The Trust Clinic Shelter, located in Northwest Washington, housed 127.
Given only thirty days' notice, the private contractors scrambled to assist their
shelter residents in locating other places to stay. The Coalition for the Homeless,
which operated the Pierce School Shelter, prepared a disposition plan describing,
in part, the special needs of the residents. More than fifty were substance abusers;
eighteen demonstrated obvious mental health needs; ten were identified as former
patients of St. Elizabeth psychiatric hospital. 88
After several weeks, realizing that it would not be able to assure appropriate
placement or referral for several dozen men before the scheduled closing date, the
Coalition requested an extension.18 9 Meanwhile, the operators of the Trust Clinic
experienced similar difficulties. Less than one week before the scheduled closing,
the District's census revealed that the Trust Clinic was still filled to capacity.1 0
Despite clear indications that the two contractors were unable to assure alternative
virtually incoherent and unchanged by his "neighbors'" well-meaning efforts. "[P]eople have tried to help
him," the article stated, "but somehow he keeps ending up homeless." Id.
185. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA FISCAL YEAR 1991 BUDGET V-126. Spolar, Uncertain Fate of D.C.'s
Homeless, supra note 162, at DI, D6.
186. See, e.g., Logan Circle Community Association Newsletter, June 1991 ("Why does the DC
government allow homeless shelters, homeless hotels, halfway houses, and other types of [community-based
residential facilities] to be concentrated in our residential neighborhood while other wards and neighborhoods
have few or no CBRFs?").
187. Declaration of Earnest C. Taylor, § 5, Exhibit C to Defendant's Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion
for a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Johnson v. Dixon, No. 91-1979 (D.D.C, Aug.
9, 1991).
188.

COALITION FOR THE HOMELESS. DISPOSITION PLAN FOR THE CLOSING OF PIERCE SHELTER 1 (Aug.

10, 1991).
189. Letter from Coalition to Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon (July 30, 1991).
190.

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY SHELTER AND SUPPORT SERVICES, D.C. COMMISSION ON SOCIAL SERVICES.

CITY-OPERATED OR CONTRACTED ADULTS SERVICES DAILY CENSUS REPORT (Aug. 5, 1991).
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placements for their residents, and despite pleas from many service and housing
providers asking for a delay, the District refused to change the original closing
date. 19 ' The District also refused an offer from CCNV to operate one of the
9 2
shelters with the government paying only for utilities.1
B.

Johnson v. Dixon

On August 7, 1991, advocates filed suit in U.S. District Court, 10 3 seeking a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to stop the shelter closings.
The primary claim was brought under the Fair Housing Act (FHA), which states
that
it shall be unlawful to discriminate in the sale, or rental, or to otherwise make
unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap
ofa) that buyer or renter;
b) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is
so sold, rented or made available; or
c) any person associated with that buyer or renter.""'
In addition to prohibiting actions motivated by discriminatory intent or having a
disparate impact on protected individuals, the FHA defined discrimination to
include
a refusal to make reasonableaccommodations in rules, policies, practices, or
services, when such accommodations may be necessary to afford such person
equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling.' 9
The definition of "handicapped" under the Act includes

191. Spolar, supra note 162, at D5.
192. Id.
193. Johnson v. Dixon, No. 91-1979 (D.D.C. voluntarily dismissed Dc. 4. 1991) [hereinafter Johnson].
Voluntarily dismissed.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(0(1) (1988). Regulations promulgated by HUD state that "examples of
dwelling units include .... shelters intended for occupancy as a residence for homeless persons." 24 C.F.R.
§ 100.201 (1991).
195. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(b) (1988).
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(1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of
such person's major life activities,
(2) a record of having such an impairment, or
(3) being regarded as having such an impairment. 196
The Johnson lawsuit alleged that the "vast majority" of affected shelter
residents were handicapped as defined by the FHA, based on medical
documentation that forty percent were chronically ill, thirty percent were mentally
ill, and fourteen percent were HIV positive.1"'
The complaint claimed three forms of discrimination against people protected by
the FHA. First, in capitulating to neighborhood opposition that was
discriminatory, the District constructively adopted an intent to discriminate
against disabled people."9 8 Second, the shelter closings had a disparate impact on
disabled people who were adversely affected and those -who were not disabled.199
Third, the District refused to make "reasonable accommodations" in its plans to
close the shelters, thereby denying disabled people an equal opportunity to use the
public shelter program. 0 0 Plaintiffs submitted several dozen declarations from
shelter residents stating that no one had assisted them in locating another place to
stay and that they were unaware of other places to stay.
In addition to the FHA claim, the complaint raised claims based on due
process, 01 District shelter regulations,2 0' and the D.C. Hospitalization of the
Mentally Ill Act.' 0 3
196. 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h) (1988); see A.F.A.P.S. v. Regulations and Permits Administration, 740 F.
Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1990) (persons afflicted by AIDS are "handicapped" for purposes of FHA).
197. Johnson, Affidavit of Sister Veronica Daniels, S 3 (Aug. 7, 1991).
198. Johnson, First Amended Complaint, 1 28 (Aug. 15, 1991).
199. Id. T 29.
200. Id. 1 30.
201. The complaint alleged that shelter residents were deprived of an opportunity to present written
comments in violation of the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, relying upon Williams v. Barry, 490 F.
Supp. 941, 946-47 (D.D.C. 1980) (entitlement requiring procedural due process created even in absence of
statutory language where "consistent, positive action" gave rise to a "mutually explicit understanding"
between homeless persons and the city). Johnson, First Amended Complaint,
45-47 (Aug. 15, 1991).
202. The complaint alleged non-compliance with regulations requiring pre-termination written notice to
shelter residents outlining available appeal procedures, as well as requiring case manager consultation and
assistance in obtaining alternative housing arrangements. D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 29, §§ 2503.6, 2506.6.
Johnson, Gomplaint
36-43.
203. The complaint alleged that the affected population included a significant percentage of former
patients of St. Elizabeths Hospital who were being deprived of "medical and psychiatric care and treatment"
in community-based facilities that are less restrictive alternatives to St. Elizabeths, in violation of D.C. Code
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The District argued that the FHA did not apply to these facts, insisting that
overnight emergency shelters are not "dwellings." Even assuming FHA coverage,
the District strenuously maintained that the decision to close the shelters was
driven by the need to reduce deficit spending and to disperse shelters more evenly
throughout the city, and that community opposition had not played a primary
role.204 The District also argued that, because the total number of vacant beds
exceeded the number of beds to be closed, no one would be without shelter. 05 In
response to the due process claim, the District asserted that in the 1990
Amendment Act "the people of the District of Columbia speaking through their
D.C. Council ...expressly determined that there is no entitlement to emergency
overnight shelter for single adults. ' 200 The District characterized the legal
challenge in Johnson as a "political battle over who should control the District's
'207
ability to set its house in order.
Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson accepted the District's representation that
alternative shelter spaces would be made available, expressed doubt as to whether
plaintiffs had established federal jurisdiction, and denied plaintiffs' application for
a temporary restraining order halting the scheduled closings. 20 8 The shelters closed
as scheduled on the night of August 10, 1991.
Many of the fears expressed to the court were realized in the two weeks between
the shelter closings and the preliminary injunction hearing. Many displaced shelter
residents spent nights sleeping in parks or other inappropriate places .2o Some sick
§ 21-562. Johnson, Complaint
32-34.
204. Johnson, Affidavit of Earnest Taylor, It 4. 7 (Aug. 9, 1991). Plaintiffs. however, questioned
whether the closings were motivated by budgetary reasons, pointing to the fact that the District had
jeopardized several hundred thousand dollars in federal Emergency Shelter Grants (ESG). The District had
received ESG grants to renovate the Trust Clinic and Pierce buildings on the condition that the two buildings
would be used as shelters for between three and 10 years. 24 CFR § 575.53 (1991). Violations of this use
restriction leave recipients open to HUD sanctions, including forfeiture of grants. 24 CFR § 575.69 (1991).
The District subsequently asked for, and eventually received, permission from HUD to use the Pierce ESG
grant monies for another District shelter. See Letter from John S. Hampton, Acting Director of D.C.
Department of Housing and Community Development to . Toni Thomas, Manager, HUD D.C. Field Office
(Aug. 20, 1991), and Letter from Thomas to Hampton (Oct. 22. 1991). The Trust Clinic continues to house a
jobs program for homeless person.
205. Johnson, Affidavit of Earnest Taylor, T 6 (Aug. 9, 1991).
206. Johnson, Defendants' Opposition at 7-8 (Aug. 9. 1991).
207. Id. at 26.
208. Order (Aug. 9, 1991).
209. See, e.g., Declaration of Wade E. Johnson T 5, (Aug. 21, 1991) (-Since the shelter clo.ed ... I
have stayed on a bench at Dupont Circle. The other shelters are full and there's a lot of commotion. You
might get beat up. Last night I slept by a building and in a bus stop when it rained"); Declaration of George
Morales 1 5 (Aug. 14, 1991) ("I am now staying at Franklin Park in downtown Washington. I sleep under a
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residents were separated from their medical providers.21 0 Some recovering
substance abusers were left without any alternative support program. 211 Some
residents found shelter elsewhere but were cut off from their prior sources of food
and employment, as well as their mail. 212 Plaintiffs submitted several dozen
additional sworn statements asserting that judicial intervention was necessary to
avert irreparable injury. When asked a final question at the hearing about what
would happen if the court declined to order relief, the local Health Care for the
Homeless Medical Director answered in one word: "Death."
Plaintiffs intended to use the preliminary injunction hearing to present live
testimony from four shelter residents. This effort to portray the human costs of the
shelter closings-and to outline what steps could have easily been taken to
accommodate their needs -was derailed at the outset. Judge Jackson began the
hearing by informing counsel that he would not permit testimony from members of
the plaintiff class.2 13 Plaintiffs presented testimony from a physician, a nurse, and
a social worker, all of whom testified that the displaced shelter residents had
suffered incalculable harm. Moreover, the witnesses testified that inexpensive,
uncomplicated actions (such as arranging for a resident to be treated by a different
physician and forwarding medical records) could have avoided the harm and could
tree or on a bench. Because it is out in the open, I have to sleep with one eye open. It is impossible for me to
relax. I have no place to take a shower. I have to hide my belongings so that no one steals them. I no longer
have a mailing address.").
210. John Doe, a 38-year-old man diagnosed as HIV-positive and suffering from various medical
problems, reported spending two nights sleeping in a park after the Trust Clinic closed and experiencing
difficulty maintaining regular contact with his doctors because they were located a great distance from the
District shelter where he moved. Johnson, Plaintiffs' Written Proffer of Testimony at 2-4 (Aug. 28, 1991).
211. A 26-year-old recovering alcoholic reported that after having regained sobriety through a support
program at the Trust Clinic, he found himself with no place to go after the shelter closed. After sleeping in a
park near Union Station for several nights, he returned to alcohol. Id. at 5-7.
212. See, e.g., Johnson, Declaration of Clarence Coley 113, 5 (Aug. 20, 1991) ("While at Trust Clinic,
I went to [the] Labor Pool at 14 and S [StreetjN.W. to get a job. I was getting lot of temporary jobs. The
Labor Pool open at 4:15 a.m. and if you arrive after 5 a.m. you probably wont get a job. I could walk to the
Labor Pool from Trust Clinic ....Since the shelter closed, I have been staying at Emery [a District shelter
located in Northeast Washington]. I have had trouble finding work. I have to leave Emery at 3:45 to get to the
Labor Pool in time to get a job. Since it's hard to leave so early I don't get there as often. I haven't worked as
much since I left the Trust Clinic"). See also Declaration of Steve Cleghorn, Director of Jobs for Homeless
People, Trust Clinic, 1 2-3 (Aug. 21, 1991) ("Mail for the former residents of the Trust Clinic is
still . . . piling up in the vacant part of the shelter, [including] . . . 17 Food Stamp Vouchers, 2 Urgent

Health Notices, 6 Food Stamp Certificates, 2 Jury Notices, 12 Court Notices, I Employment Testing Notice,
2 Notices Re: Medical Assistance Benefits, 6 Medical Assistance Cards, 3 SSI Disability Checks, I
Unemployment Check, 3 Unemployment Benefits Correspondence, 3 Education Loan Correspondence, 7
Department of Public and Assisted Housing Notices.").
213. Plaintiffs were limited to submitting a written proffer of testimony from the witnesses.
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even at this late date be speedily implemented.
This testimony formed the crux of plaintiffs' primary legal claim at the
preliminary injunction stage, specifically whether the District had refused to make
"reasonable accommodations" for shelter residents protected by the FHA.
Plaintiffs asked the court to order the District to prepare individualized case
management plans, as already set forth in District shelter regulations, and to
2
provide services in a manner appropriate to each individual's disability. '
Plaintiffs also asked the court to order the District to reopen the two shelters and
to refrain from closing additional shelters until such social services were in
215
place.
In opposition, the District argued that the displaced shelter residents had merely
been "inconvenienced" and not irreparably injured by the shelter closings. The
District's shelter director testified that, as far as he knew, the shelter closings had
been accomplished with few problems, and that the District had discharged its
responsibilities to the shelter residents.
In a 16-page Memorandum and Order filed one week after the hearing, Judge
Jackson denied plaintiffs' motion. The court found that many of the affected
shelter residents had been "regulars" and that Pierce or Trust Clinic were
regarded as their "neighborhood" shelter near their most basic means of
support.21 The court also accepted, for purposes of the motion, that numerous
former shelter residents "are currently living and sleeping, literally, out-of-doors in
the District of Columbia," and that many are "handicapped" as defined by anti217
discrimination laws.
Nonetheless, the court rejected plaintiffs' two federal claims. On the FHA
claim, the court expressed doubt as to whether the law applied to the District's
homeless shelters, but nonetheless ruled on the merits of plaintiffs' discrimination
claim. Finding no evidence of "overtly discriminatory collusion," the court rejected
a claim of discriminatory intent. It also rejected a disparate impact claim, finding
that the disabled population is more or less evenly dispersed throughout the
District shelter system. Finally, the availability of beds elsewhere in the shelter
system led the court to conclude that all displaced residents had been
accommodated, "according to their own respective limitations, and the

214.
215.
216.
217.

Johnson, Plaintiffs' Proposed Order at 1-2 (Sept. 5, 1991).
Id.
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 2-3 (Sept. 5, 1991).
Id. at 4-5.
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'
District's."218
On the due process claim, the court observed that the repeal of the right to
shelter in 1990 had worked a "sea change" in the law, eliminating any pre-existing
entitlement to shelter.21 9 The court frequently alluded to the District's "finite
resources" and "straitened circumstances," concluding that "[i]t has, by its elected
officials, made a governmental judgment to assign the homeless a lesser priority
than they may have had in the past, and it appears to have the right to do so
'220
without any judicial second-guessing, at least by the federal judiciary.

C.

Legislative Actions to Curtail Shelter Development

The Council also responded periodically to community opposition to facilities for
homeless persons. Introduced in 1991 were two bills, the Transitional Housing and
Emergency Shelter Licensing and Control Act of 1991221 and the CommunityBased Residential Facility Limitation Act of 1991,222 which would restrict the
development of a wide variety of "community-based residential facilities"
(CBRFs), including adult rehabilitation homes, community residential facilities,
health care facilities, homes for substance abusers, youth rehabilitation homes, and
youth residential care homes, as well as shelters and transitional housing for the
homeless. 223 In addition, these bills would restrict the development of "transitional

218. Id. at 10-12.
219. Id. at 5-6. Having rejected both federal claims, the court declined to reach the two non-federal, or
supplemental, claims. Id. at 5 n.4.
220.

Id. at 12-13.

221.

Bill 9-103 (filed Feb. 8, 1991) (introduced by Councilmember Frank Smith). No action was taken

on Bill 9-103 during the 1990-1991 legislative session of the District of Columbia Council. This bill was reintroduced on February 2, 1993 and assigned a new bill number, Bill 10-108. No action has presently been
taken on Bill 10-108.
222. Bill 9-209 (filed May 7, 1991) (introduced by Councilmember John Ray). No action was taken on
Bill 9-209 during the 1990-1991 legislative session of the District of Columbia City Council. Bill 9-209 was reintroduced on January 4, 1993 and assigned the bill number of 10-58. No action has presently been taken on
Bill 10-58.
223. See Bill No. 9-103, § 2(1); Bill No. 9-209, § 2. Current zoning regulations establish seven
categories of CBRFs - adult rehabilitation homes, community residence facilities, emergency shelters, health
care facilities, substance abusers homes, youth rehabilitation homes and youth residential care homes. See
D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 199.9 (1987). CBRFs are currently divided into three "classes," depending on
their purported impact on the community. Emergency shelters for homeless persons are "class B" facilities;
thus, any shelter for five or more persons may not be situated in a residential zone without a public hearing
and prior approval of the Board of Zoning Adjustment. Emergency shelters for four or fewer persons are
permitted as a "matter of right" in all zoning districts. See D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, §§ 201.1(n), 219.1-219.8
(1987); see also Indices, Statistical Index to D.C. Services, Vol. VII, at 276-77 (July, 1990).
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housing facilities" (THFs), residential facilities created22to provide shelter for five
or more people in accord with the Family Shelter Act. 4
Bill No. 9-103 would require all CBRFs or THFs for five or more people to be
licensed 225 and would prohibit the development of more than one such facility in
the same square or within 500 feet of another facility. 220 The bill also requires the
Mayor to "create and implement" a plan to ensure that CBRFs and THFs are
"fairly and equitably distributed" among all wards of the city and directs that all
facility licenses be issued in accordance with this plan. 227 Bill No. 9-209 requires
the city's Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs to define geographic
areas surrounding proposed new CBRFs and impose a limit of no more than fifteen
facilities within these areas. 2 8
Bill 9-103 further mandates the submission of an "adverse impact statement" by
any proponent of CBRFs and THFs. These statements must outline any "adverse
impact caused by the use" of the facility, "including noise, odors, trash and litter,
loading and unloading, parking, streets, use capacity, hours, loitering, hazardous
materials and organic compounds.1 220 The bill also requires the Mayor to publish
a public notice of any application for transitional housing, 230 to determine whether
such housing would "adversely affect the health, safety or welfare of persons
residing in the neighborhood of the proposed use .... be detrimental to the public
welfare or injurious to property or improvements, ... and.., be in accord with
[the] ... equitable distribution plan" described above,23 ' and to issue licenses only
to those facilities that will not have an adverse impact.
Most of the written testimony regarding Bills 9-209 and 9-103 reflected
opposition, both on the grounds that such legislation would violate federal law
protecting persons with disabilities and families from housing discriminationm and
224. See Bill 9-103, § 2(2). Current D.C. zoning regulations do not impose any restrictions on THFs
that are greater than the regulations imposed on other apartment developments.
225. Bill No. 9-103 §§ 2(2), 4(a).
226. Id. § 3(c),(d).
227.

Id. § 8(b).

228. Bill 9-209, § 3. Bill 9-209 also specifically prohibits the development of more than fifteen CBRFs
in the "Columbia Heights" neighborhood of Northwest D.C. Id. § 3(a)(l).
229. Bill No. 9-103, § 8(b).
230. Although this section of Bill 9-103 refers to "transitional housing", it is likely that the proposal is
intended to apply to both THFs and CBRFs.
231.

Bill No. 9-103, § 9.

232. See, e.g. testimony of Claudia Schlosberg, Coordinator, Dixon implementation Monitoring
Committee, at 2-5, 9-10 (June 13, 1991) (asserting that provisions of 9-209 and 9-103 violated the Fair
Housing Act Amendments of 1988). See also testimony of Aubrey H. Edwards, Acting Director. D.C.
Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs, at 10-11 (June 13, 1991).
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force the city to ignore other legal obligations to provide community-based
residential care to children in the city's custody and to people with disabilities.208
The city's Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs was also critical of 9209 and 9-103, asserting that the new licensing requirement for THFs would
"place severely restrictive spacing requirements and delays on homeless
families," 234 and that provisions of both bills would "add another layer of
bureaucracy" to the city's existing licensing and zoning processes. 235
Representatives of three District communities that house shelters and other
facilities supported the bills, however. Some even suggested additional restrictions
on CBRFs and THFs.2 36 Such testimony demonstrates that some District
neighborhoods feel burdened by a perceived "over-concentration" of shelters, other
group facilities, and organizations providing services to homeless people, 23 7 and
that residents blame this "over-concentration" for diminishing and even destroying
the quality of life in their neighborhoods, for driving out community businesses
and long-term residents, 238 and for creating an atmosphere of filth, health
hazards,2 39 fear, and danger.240 As of this writing, the CBRF/THF bills are still
pending before the Council.
Whether or not they are enacted, these bills are emblematic of repeated efforts
to restrict shelter and service efforts. Large shelters are roundly opposed as

233. See testimony of Diane Flanagan-Montgomery, Executive Director, D.C. Coalition for the
Homeless, at 6 (June 13, 1991). See also Edwards testimony, supra note 232, at 9-11 (June 13, 1991).
234. Edwards testimony, supra note 232, at 4.
235. Id. at 12.
236. See testimony on Bill 9-103 of the Metropolitan Police Department Third District Police Advisory
Council (June 13, 1991); testimony on Bill 9-103 and Bill 9-209 of the Logan Circle Community Association
(June 13, 1991); testimony on Bill 9-103 of the Cardozo-Shaw Neighborhood Association (June 13, 1991);
testimony on Bill 9-209 and Bill 9-103 of Advisory Neighborhood Commission IA (June 13, 1991).
237. The testimony submitted by the Logan Circle Community Association expressed the view that
service and support organizations for CBRFs and homeless persons "also have an adverse affect on the
neighborhood because they attract individuals who may not necessarily stay overnight, but who use the
support facilities during the day and loiter on the parks and streets afterwards." Logan Circle Community
Association testimony, supra note 236, at 4.
238. Id. at 3.
239. See id. at I (Residents of homeless shelters in Logan Circle are "turned out into the neighborhood
at 7:00 a.m ....,without supervision and toilet facilities. Consequently, they urinate and defecate on our
streets, in our alleys and parks .... They leave their feces, trash, used drug needles, broken liquor bottles,
soiled clothes and stench for the community to deal with.").
240. See, e.g., Testimony of Barbara Rothenberg for the Third District Advisory Council, supra note
236, at I (As a result of an encounter with a homeless man who begged for money and shouted threats when
no money was given, "I felt threatened and afraid even to walk down the streets of my neighborhood in broad
daylight. Unfortunately, this is not an uncommon experience.").
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"warehousing" and dangerous in that they concentrate homeless people in open
areas. Small, decentralized facilities, with far less impact on surrounding
neighborhoods, are criticized as inimical. The District government's response has
been to place more and more restrictions even on private sector solutions, rather
than to assist in finding solutions together with private providers.

VL

CONCLUSION

The events discussed in this article demonstrate that both litigation and
legislative advocacy have been imperfect tools in the effort to force the District of
Columbia to address the serious, politically charged, and potentially expensive
problem of sheltering and serving homeless citizens. The District's response to
Initiative 17 and the Family Shelter Act illustrate the truism that passage of
legislation does not ensure the government's compliance; indeed, the city displayed
the same recalcitrance in obeying both a referendum imposed on the government
over its objections and a statute created by the City Council itself.
Secondly, Atchison and Fountain point out the shortcomings of litigation in
forcing a government defendant to comply with the law when the defendant fights
enforcement at every turn and chooses contempt findings and fines over
compliance. A comparison of the role played by the D.C. Superior Court judges in
Atchison and Fountain with that of the federal judge in Johnson illustrates
another potential consideration in representing the interests of homeless persons in
court: the need for judges who will confront and resolve these issues and not
relegate them to the "political" arena, as the federal court did in Johnson. A
judge's willingness to hear about these problems from the perspective of homeless
people is also key. In Atchison and Fountain,judges heard graphic testimony from
homeless people themselves about the human costs of the District's noncompliance.
Those judges rejected budgetary justifications and ordered immediate relief.
In Johnson, Judge Jackson denied the homeless witnesses their day in court,
summarily denied their request for relief, and expressed understanding of the
District's financial woes. To advocates, the lesson is clear: Do all you can to ensure
that your clients have their day in court.
On the other hand, both litigation and legislative advocacy have advantages.
Although some of the ground won through Initiative 17 has been lost, Atchison
forced the city to create a shelter system that, for the most part, eliminated the
inhumane, degrading conditions challenged in 1988. In addition, notwithstanding
the outcome thus far in Johnson, litigators can still turn to federal statutes such as
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the Fair Housing Act, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,241 and the
recently-enacted Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA) 242 to vindicate the rights
of homeless people who have mental and physical disabilities.
Finally, the advocacy that prompted the passage of Initiative 17 and the
unsuccessful fight to overturn the 1990 amendments gave voters an opportunity to
address the issue of homelessness directly. This continued public debate may still
give advocates the foundation they need to push the city to establish a variety of

shelter programs and to provide adequate services for the homeless, especially if
enough voters truly believe that the District is not doing enough to serve homeless
citizens or to abolish homelessness, and if they eventually tire, winter after winter,
of leaving their workplaces only to step over the bodies of their fellow citizens,
sleeping on the sidewalk.

241. 29 U.S.C. § 794-794(a) (1988). This statute prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by
any recipient of federal funds, including municipal governments.
242. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101 et seq. (West 1992)).
The ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability by both public and private entities. Any homeless
shelter operated by the District of Columbia would be an "instrumentality of a State... or local government"
covered by the ADA. See id. § 12131. ADA provisions prohibiting discrimination by private entities explicitly
include homeless shelters operated by private actors (such as shelters operated by individuals or organizations
with city contracts or by non-profit organizations) as "places of public accommodation" covered by the Act.
See id. § 12181(7)(k)). See also regulations promulgated by the Department of Justice to implement ADA
requirements for private entities, noting that homeless shelters intended for "short-term stays" and shelters
that provide social services to shelter residents are covered by the ADA. These regulations indicate that
shelters intended for "long-term stays" would be covered by the Fair Housing Act, rather than the ADA.
Department of Justice, Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in
Commercial Facilities; Final Rule, 56 Fed. Reg. 35544, 35552, col. 1-2 (July 26, 1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R.
Part 36 (1992)).

